Related papers: Bribeproof mechanisms for two-values domains
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
A growing body of work in economics and computation focuses on the trade-off between implementability and simplicity in mechanism design. The goal is to develop a theory that not only allows to design an incentive structure easy to grasp…
Bribe demands present a social conflict scenario where decisions have wide-ranging economic and ethical consequences. Nevertheless, such incidents occur daily in many countries across the globe. Harassment bribery constitute a significant…
We introduce a model of probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal elicits a message from the agent and then selects a test to give the agent. The agent's true type determines the probability with which he can pass each…
Dealing with quadratic payments, marginal probability is usually considered ideally constant, maybe for the sake of initial simplicity. Considering the voting scenario depicted in "Quadratic Payments: A Primer" by Vitalik Buterin, firstly…
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this…
This paper explores reward mechanisms for a query incentive network in which agents seek information from social networks. In a query tree issued by the task owner, each agent is rewarded by the owner for contributing to the solution, for…
In the Shift Bribery problem, we are given an election (based on preference orders), a preferred candidate $p$, and a budget. The goal is to ensure that $p$ wins by shifting $p$ higher in some voters' preference orders. However, each such…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
We consider the fundamental scenario where a single item is to be sold to one of two agents. Both agents draw their valuation for the item from the same probability distribution. However, only one of them submits a bid to the mechanism. The…
Despite numerous countermeasures proposed by practitioners and researchers, remote control-flow alteration of programs with memory-safety vulnerabilities continues to be a realistic threat. Guaranteeing that complex software is completely…
Pricing financial or real options with arbitrary payoffs in regime-switching models is an important problem in finance. Mathematically, it is to solve, under certain standard assumptions, a general form of optimal stopping problems in…
The paper studies sub and super-replication price bounds for contingent claims defined on general trajectory based market models. No prior probabilistic or topological assumptions are placed on the trajectory space, trading is assumed to…
We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…
We study the risk assessment of uncertain cash flows in terms of dynamic convex risk measures for processes as introduced in Cheridito, Delbaen, and Kupper (2006). These risk measures take into account not only the amounts but also the…
We unify and establish equivalence between the pathwise and the quasi-sure approaches to robust modelling of financial markets in discrete time. In particular, we prove a Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing and a Superhedging Theorem,…
Coin flipping is a cryptographic primitive for which strictly better protocols exist if the players are not only allowed to exchange classical, but also quantum messages. During the past few years, several results have appeared which give a…
In blockchain, bribery is an inevitable problem since users with various goals can bribe miners by transferring cryptoassets. To alleviate the negative effects of such collusion, Ethereum blockchain implemented new transaction fee mechanism…
Recently, in order to explore the mechanism behind wealth or income distribution, several models have been proposed by applying principles of statistical mechanics. These models share some characteristics, such as consisting of a group of…
This paper studies a mechanism design problem over a network, where agents can only participate by referrals. The Bulow-Klemberer theorem proposes that expanding the number of participants is a more effective approach to increase revenue…