Related papers: Constrained Linear Quadratic Stackelberg Games wit…
A supremum-of-quadratics representation for convex barrier-type constraints is developed and applied within the context of a class of continuous time state constrained linear regulator problems. Using this representation, it is shown that a…
We investigate the discrete-time stochastic linear quadratic control problem for a population of cooperative agents under the hard equality constraint on total control inputs, motivated by demand response in renewable energy systems. We…
In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete…
Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive…
This paper proposes networked dynamics to solve resource allocation problems over time-varying multi-agent networks. The state of each agent represents the amount of used resources (or produced utilities) while the total amount of resources…
Network coordination games are widely used to model collaboration among interconnected agents, with applications across diverse domains including economics, robotics, and cyber-security. We consider networks of bounded-rational agents who…
In a Stackelberg congestion game (SCG), a leader aims to maximize their own gain by anticipating and manipulating the equilibrium state at which the followers settle by playing a congestion game. Often formulated as bilevel programs,…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
Distributed optimal control is known to be challenging and can become intractable even for linear-quadratic regulator problems. In this work, we study a special class of such problems where distributed state feedback controllers can give…
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
Effectively predicting intent and behavior requires inferring leadership in multi-agent interactions. Dynamic games provide an expressive theoretical framework for modeling these interactions. Employing this framework, we propose a novel…
We consider the multi-agent spatial navigation problem of computing the socially optimal order of play, i.e., the sequence in which the agents commit to their decisions, and its associated equilibrium in an N-player Stackelberg trajectory…
In this paper we propose a dynamic Stackelberg game-theoretic model for urban freight transportation planning which is able to characterize the interaction between freight and personal transportation in an urban area. The problem is…
We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the…
We study the problem of designing autonomous agents that can learn to cooperate effectively with a potentially suboptimal partner while having no access to the joint reward function. This problem is modeled as a cooperative episodic…
Stackelberg games, widely applied in domains like economics and security, involve asymmetric interactions where a leader's strategy drives follower responses. Accurately modeling these dynamics allows domain experts to optimize strategies…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…
Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about…