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We propose and study an evolutionary minority game (EMG) in which the agents are allowed to choose among three possible options. Unlike the original EMG where the agents either win or lose one unit of wealth, the present model assigns one…
Replicator equation -- a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics -- mathematizes the frequency dependent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs) with respect to the…
Evolutionary game theory has proven to be an elegant framework providing many fruitful insights in population dynamics and human behaviour. Here, we focus on the aspect of behavioural plasticity and its effect on the evolution of…
Social dilemmas are situations in which collective welfare is at odds with individual gain. One widely studied example, due to the conflict it poses between human behaviour and game theoretic reasoning, is the Traveler's Dilemma. The…
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, have been key to finding stable joint actions in multi-player games. However, it has been shown that the dynamics of agents' interactions, even in simple two-player games with…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
We study repeated games where players use an exponential learning scheme in order to adapt to an ever-changing environment. If the game's payoffs are subject to random perturbations, this scheme leads to a new stochastic version of the…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…
We introduce an analytical model to study the evolution towards equilibrium in spatial games, with `memory-aware' agents, i.e., agents that accumulate their payoff over time. In particular, we focus our attention on the spatial Prisoner's…
We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the…
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…
We consider the dynamic behavior of several variants of the Network Creation Game, introduced by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03]. Equilibrium networks in these models have desirable properties like low social cost and small diameter, which makes…
It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic…
The evolution and long-term sustenance of cooperation has consistently piqued scholarly interest across the disciplines of evolutionary biology and social sciences. Previous theoretical and experimental studies on collective risk social…