Related papers: Online learning in repeated auctions
We consider the problem of contextual bandits and imitation learning, where the learner lacks direct knowledge of the executed action's reward. Instead, the learner can actively query an expert at each round to compare two actions and…
In the matroid buyback problem, an algorithm observes a sequence of bids and must decide whether to accept each bid at the moment it arrives, subject to a matroid constraint on the set of accepted bids. Decisions to reject bids are…
A central problem in online learning and decision making -- from bandits to reinforcement learning -- is to understand what modeling assumptions lead to sample-efficient learning guarantees. We consider a general adversarial decision making…
We study the problem of expert advice under partial bandit feedback setting and create a sequential minimax optimal algorithm. Our algorithm works with a more general partial monitoring setting, where, in contrast to the classical bandit…
Online learning has traditionally focused on the expected rewards. In this paper, a risk-averse online learning problem under the performance measure of the mean-variance of the rewards is studied. Both the bandit and full information…
The housing market, also known as one-sided matching market, is a classic exchange economy model where each agent on the demand side initially owns an indivisible good (a house) and has a personal preference over all goods. The goal is to…
Most work on sequential learning assumes a fixed set of actions that are available all the time. However, in practice, actions can consist of picking subsets of readings from sensors that may break from time to time, road segments that can…
We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational…
We address the problem of learning in an online setting where the learner repeatedly observes features, selects among a set of actions, and receives reward for the action taken. We provide the first efficient algorithm with an optimal…
We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely arbitrary (i.e., determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with private valuations for the good and the goal is to design a…
We consider the problem of online fair division of indivisible goods to players when there are a finite number of types of goods and player values are drawn from distributions with unknown means. Our goal is to maximize social welfare…
We consider the problem of online allocation subject to a long-term fairness penalty. Contrary to existing works, however, we do not assume that the decision-maker observes the protected attributes -- which is often unrealistic in practice.…
We consider an assortment selection and pricing problem in which a seller has $N$ different items available for sale. In each round, the seller observes a $d$-dimensional contextual preference information vector for the user, and offers to…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
We study an online linear optimization (OLO) problem in which the learner is provided access to $K$ "hint" vectors in each round prior to making a decision. In this setting, we devise an algorithm that obtains logarithmic regret whenever…
We study the attainable regret for online linear optimization problems with bandit feedback, where unlike the full-information setting, the player can only observe its own loss rather than the full loss vector. We show that the price of…
We introduce a new algorithm for online linear-quadratic control in a known system subject to adversarial disturbances. Existing regret bounds for this setting scale as $\sqrt{T}$ unless strong stochastic assumptions are imposed on the…
We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part…
We present and study a partial-information model of online learning, where a decision maker repeatedly chooses from a finite set of actions, and observes some subset of the associated losses. This naturally models several situations where…
Online advertising banners are sold in real-time through auctions.Typically, the more banners a user is shown, the smaller the marginalvalue of the next banner for this user is. This fact can be detected bybasic ML models, that can be used…