Related papers: Evolutionary Games on the Torus with Weak Selectio…
In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric $N$-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other…
For matrix games we study how small nonzero probability must be used in optimal strategies. We show that for nxn win-lose-draw games (i.e. (-1,0,1) matrix games) nonzero probabilities smaller than n^{-O(n)} are never needed. We also…
An attempt is made to find a comprehensive mathematical framework in which to investigate the problems of well-posedness and asymptotic analysis for fully nonlinear evolutionary game theoretic models. The model should be rich enough to…
We consider three distinct discrete-time models of learning and evolution in games: a biological model based on intra-species selective pressure, the dynamics induced by pairwise proportional imitation, and the exponential / multiplicative…
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games are studied with players located on square lattice and random regular graphs defining four neighbors for each one. The players follow one of the three strategies: tit-for-tat, unconditional cooperation,…
Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…
We introduce and study an interacting particle system evolving on the $d$-dimensional torus $(\mathbb Z/N\mathbb Z)^d$. Each vertex of the torus can be either empty or occupied by an individual of type $\lambda \in (0,\infty)$. An…
We study the population genetics of Evolution in the important special case of weak selection, in which all fitness values are assumed to be close to one another. We show that in this regime natural selection is tantamount to the…
We consider evolutionary games in which the agent selected for update compares their payoff to q neighbours, rather than a single neighbour as in standard evolutionary game theory. Through studying fixed point stability and fixation times…
In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…
In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provides a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call {\sigma} law,…
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…
Spatial evolutionary games are studied with myopic players whose payoff interest, as a personal character, is tuned from selfishness to other-regarding preference via fraternity. The players are located on a square lattice and collect…
We revisit in this paper the relation between evolution of species and the mathematical tool of evolutionary games, which has been used to model and predict it. We indicate known shortcoming of this model that restricts the capacity of…
Discrete time evolution of one-dimensional maps is embedded in continuous time by truncating the Taylor series expansion of the time evolution operator to a finite order N. Truncations with N > 4 leads to unconditional instability.…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
We study the problem of solving matrix games of the form $\min_{\mathbf{p}\in\Delta}\max_{\mathbf{w}\in\mathcal{W}}\mathbf{p}^{\top}A\mathbf{w}$, where $A$ is a matrix and $\Delta$ is the probability simplex. This problem encapsulates…
Let game B be Toral's cooperative Parrondo game with (one-dimensional) spatial dependence, parameterized by N (3 or more) and p_0,p_1,p_2,p_3 in [0,1], and let game A be the special case p_0=p_1=p_2=p_3=1/2. Let mu_B (resp., mu_(1/2,1/2))…
We present some results of simulations of population growth and evolution, using the standard asexual Penna model, with individuals characterized by a string of bits representing a genome containing some possible mutations. After about…