Related papers: Totally Unimodular Congestion Games
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for…
We study a novel approach to information design in the standard traffic model of network congestion games. It captures the natural condition that the demand is unknown to the users of the network. A principal (e.g., a mobility service)…
Although dynamic games provide a rich paradigm for modeling agents' interactions, solving these games for real-world applications is often challenging. Many real-world interactive settings involve general nonlinear state and input…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
Distributed optimization and Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems have drawn much attention in the control community recently. This paper studies a class of non-cooperative games, known as N-cluster game, which subsumes both cooperative…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that each 2-player game whose convex program has linear…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop model which…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
We consider differentiable games where the goal is to find a Nash equilibrium. The machine learning community has recently started using variants of the gradient method (GD). Prime examples are extragradient (EG), the optimistic gradient…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
Rosenthal (1973) introduced the class of congestion games and proved that they always possess a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Fotakis et al. (2005) introduce the notion of a greedy strategy tuple, where players sequentially and…
We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure. Prominent…
Sensor network localization (SNL) problems require determining the physical coordinates of all sensors in a network. This process relies on the global coordinates of anchors and the available measurements between non-anchor and anchor…
This paper shows the existence of $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{n^\gamma})$-Nash equilibria in $n$-player noncooperative sum-aggregative games in which the players' cost functions, depending only on their own action and the average of all players'…
Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…