Related papers: On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing
We formalize a framework for coordinating funding and selecting projects, the costs of which are shared among agents with quasi-linear utility functions and individual budgets. Our model contains the classical discrete participatory…
Consider the the problem of maximizing the relative social welfare of truthful single-winner voting schemes with cardinal preferences compared to the classical range voting scheme. The range voting scheme is a simple and straightforward…
The Walras approach to equilibrium focuses on the existence of market prices at which the total demands for goods are matched by the total supplies. Trading activities that might identify such prices by bringing agents together as potential…
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and mulitagent decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, they must often…
We study fair and efficient allocation of divisible goods, in an online manner, among $n$ agents. The goods arrive online in a sequence of $T$ time periods. The agents' values for a good are revealed only after its arrival, and the online…
Several fairness concepts have been proposed recently in attempts to approximate envy-freeness in settings with indivisible goods. Among them, the concept of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is arguably the closest to envy-freeness.…
We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…
In most of microeconomic theory, consumers are assumed to exhibit decreasing marginal utilities. This paper considers combinatorial auctions among such submodular buyers. The valuations of such buyers are placed within a hierarchy of…
In many settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not necessarily implemented simultaneously. Future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players in each auction, introducing externalities.…
We study the worst-case welfare of item pricing in the \emph{tollbooth problem}. The problem was first introduced by Guruswami et al, and is a special case of the combinatorial auction in which (i) each of the $m$ items in the auction is an…
We consider a simple sequential allocation procedure for sharing indivisible items between agents in which agents take turns to pick items. Supposing additive utilities and independence between the agents, we show that the expected utility…
We study a participatory budgeting problem of aggregating the preferences of agents and dividing a budget over the projects. A budget division solution is a probability distribution over the projects. The main purpose of our study concerns…
Although approximate notions of envy-freeness-such as envy-freeness up to one good (EF1)-have been extensively studied for indivisible goods, the seemingly simpler fairness concept of proportionality up to one good (PROP1) has received far…
Assortment optimization refers to the problem of designing a slate of products to offer potential customers, such as stocking the shelves in a convenience store. The price of each product is fixed in advance, and a probabilistic choice…
Maximizing the revenue from selling _more than one_ good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple "one-dimensional" mechanisms, such as…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
We consider {\em profit-maximization} problems for {\em combinatorial auctions} with {\em non-single minded valuation functions} and {\em limited supply}. We obtain fairly general results that relate the approximability of the…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash welfare (MNW) while allocating indivisible goods to asymmetric agents. The Nash welfare of an allocation is the weighted geometric mean of agents' utilities, and the allocation with maximum Nash…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to agents with weights corresponding to their entitlements. Previous work has shown that, when agents have binary additive valuations, the maximum weighted Nash welfare rule is…
Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…