Related papers: Learning in Auctions: Regret is Hard, Envy is Easy
In this paper, we present new results on the fair and efficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences correspond to {\em matroid rank functions}. This is a versatile valuation class with several desirable properties…
The simultaneous multiple-round auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) are the two primary mechanisms used to sell bandwidth. Under truthful bidding, the SMRA is known to output a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes…
We explore the striking mathematical connections that exist between market scoring rules, cost function based prediction markets, and no-regret learning. We show that any cost function based prediction market can be interpreted as an…
Multi-Robot Task Allocation (MRTA) is a central challenge in decentralized multi-agent systems, where teams of robots must cooperatively assign and execute tasks under limited communication while optimizing global performance objectives.…
We study a generalization of the online binary prediction with expert advice framework where at each round, the learner is allowed to pick $m\geq 1$ experts from a pool of $K$ experts and the overall utility is a modular or submodular…
We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only the equilibrium price and quantity are…
We study the regulation of algorithmic (non-)collusion amongst sellers in dynamic imperfect price competition by auditing their data as introduced by Hartline et al. [2024]. We develop an auditing method that tests whether a seller's…
The proliferation of the Internet has led to the emergence of online advertising, driven by the mechanics of online auctions. In these repeated auctions, software agents participate on behalf of aggregated advertisers to optimize for their…
We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
In game-theoretic learning, several agents are simultaneously following their individual interests, so the environment is non-stationary from each player's perspective. In this context, the performance of a learning algorithm is often…
We propose a new all-pay auction format in which risk-loving bidders pay a constant fee each time they bid for an object whose monetary value is common knowledge among the bidders, and bidding fees are the only source of benefit for the…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
Recently, Daskalakis, Fishelson, and Golowich (DFG) (NeurIPS`21) showed that if all agents in a multi-player general-sum normal-form game employ Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU), the external regret of every player is…
We develop an algorithmic framework for solving convex optimization problems using no-regret game dynamics. By converting the problem of minimizing a convex function into an auxiliary problem of solving a min-max game in a sequential…
In non-truthful auctions, agents' utility for a strategy depends on the strategies of the opponents and also the prior distribution over their private types; the set of Bayes Nash equilibria generally has an intricate dependence on the…
First-price auctions have very recently swept the online advertising industry, replacing second-price auctions as the predominant auction mechanism on many platforms. This shift has brought forth important challenges for a bidder: how…
M${}^{\natural}$-concave functions, a.k.a. gross substitute valuation functions, play a fundamental role in many fields, including discrete mathematics and economics. In practice, perfect knowledge of M${}^{\natural}$-concave functions is…
We study a two-sided market, wherein, price-sensitive heterogeneous customers and servers arrive and join their respective queues. A compatible customer-server pair can then be matched by the platform, at which point, they leave the system.…
We study repeated two-player games where one of the players, the learner, employs a no-regret learning strategy, while the other, the optimizer, is a rational utility maximizer. We consider general Bayesian games, where the payoffs of both…