Related papers: Do Prices Coordinate Markets?
A distributed, hierarchical, market based approach is introduced to solve the economic dispatch problem. The approach requires only a minimal amount of information to be shared between a central market operator and the end-users. Price…
When calibrating spatial partial equilibrium models with conjectural variations, some modelers fit the suppliers' sales to the available data in addition to total consumption and price levels. While this certainly enhances the quality of…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
The implementation of electricity markets based on locational marginal pricing in a multi-settlement process has allowed wholesale competition, with pricing mechanisms that incentivize the optimal allocation of generation, transmission, and…
Analyzing simple and natural price-adjustment processes that converge to a market equilibrium is a fundamental question in economics. Such an analysis may have implications in economic theory, computational economics, and distributed…
A group of people wishes to use money to exchange goods efficiently over several time periods. However, there are disadvantages to using any of the goods as money, and in addition fiat money issued in the form of notes or coins will be…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…
We consider a simple model of rational agents competing in a single product market described by simple linear demand curve. Contrary to accepted economic theory, the agents' production levels synchronise in the absence of conscious…
The goal of an auction is to determine commodity prices such that all participants are perfectly happy. Such a solution is called a competitive equilibrium and does not exist in general. For this reason we are interested in solutions which…
In this paper I empirically investigate prediction markets for binary options. Advocates of prediction markets have suggested that asset prices are consistent estimators of the "true" probability of a state of the world being realized. I…
In many areas of industry and society, e.g., energy, healthcare, logistics, agents collect vast amounts of data that they deem proprietary. These data owners extract predictive information of varying quality and relevance from data…
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our…
We propose a term structure power price model that, in contrast to widely accepted no-arbitrage based approaches, accounts for the non-storable nature of power. It belongs to a class of equilibrium game theoretic models with players divided…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
This paper develops a theory of competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods based entirely on economic conditions on demand. The key idea is to analyze complementarity and substitutability between bundles of goods, rather than merely…
We study a large economy in which firms cannot compute exact solutions to the non-linear equations that characterize the equilibrium price at which they can sell future output. Instead, firms use polynomial expansions to approximate prices.…
The fair division of chores, as well as mixed manna (goods and chores), has received substantial recent attention in the fair division literature; however, ours is the first paper to extend this research to matching markets. Indeed, our…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
This paper focuses on the operation of an electricity market that accounts for participants that bid at a sub-minute timescale. To that end, we model the market-clearing process as a dynamical system, called market dynamics, which is…