Related papers: Limit Your Consumption! Finding Bounds in Average-…
We consider wireless networks that can be modeled by multiple access channels in which all the terminals are equipped with multiple antennas. The propagation model used to account for the effects of transmit and receive antenna correlations…
We consider 2-player games played on a finite state space for infinite rounds. The games are concurrent: in each round, the two players choose their moves simultaneously; the current state and the moves determine the successor. We consider…
The energy-delay tradeoffs in wireless networks are studied using a game-theoretic framework. A multi-class multiple-access network is considered in which users choose their transmit powers, and possibly transmission rates, in a distributed…
Energy-based models (EBMs) provide an elegant framework for density estimation, but they are notoriously difficult to train. Recent work has established links to generative adversarial networks, where the EBM is trained through a minimax…
Decentralized multiple access channels where each transmitter wants to selfishly maximize his transmission energy-efficiency are considered. Transmitters are assumed to choose freely their power control policy and interact (through…
The capacity of wireless networks is a classic and important topic of study. Informally, the capacity of a network is simply the total amount of information which it can transfer. In the context of models of wireless radio networks, this…
The theory of mean field games studies the limiting behaviors of large systems where the agents interact with each other in a certain symmetric way. The running and terminal costs are critical for the agents to decide the strategies.…
Weighted timed games are two-player zero-sum games played in a timed automaton equipped with integer weights. We consider optimal reachability objectives, in which one of the players, that we call Min, wants to reach a target location while…
The use of game theoretic models has been quite successful in describing various cooperative and non-cooperative optimization problems in networks and other domains of computer systems. In this paper, we study an application of game…
A network of cognitive transmitters is considered. Each transmitter has to decide his power control policy in order to maximize energy-efficiency of his transmission. For this, a transmitter has two actions to take. He has to decide whether…
To what extent does the structure of the players' strategy space influence the efficiency of decentralized solutions in congestion games? In this work, we investigate whether better performance are possible when restricting to load…
People, robots, and companies mostly divide time and effort among projects, and \defined{shared effort games} model people investing resources in public endeavors and sharing the generated values. In linear $\theta$ sharing (effort) games,…
As electricity consumption grows, reducing peak demand--the maximum load on the grid--has become critical for preventing infrastructure strain and blackouts. Pricing mechanisms that incentivize consumers with flexible loads to shift…
In this paper, the interactions and energy exchange decisions of a number of geographically distributed storage units are studied under decision-making involving end-users. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between…
In this paper, we investigate a practical demand side management scenario where the selfish consumers compete to minimize their individual energy cost through scheduling their future energy consumption profiles. We propose an instantaneous…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
Given a family of graphs $\mathcal{F}$, we define the $\mathcal{F}$-saturation game as follows. Two players alternate adding edges to an initially empty graph on $n$ vertices, with the only constraint being that neither player can add an…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…