Related papers: An Analysis of Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration
Both classical and quantum version of two models of price competition in duopoly market, the one is realistic and the other is idealized, are investigated. The pure strategy Nash equilibria of the realistic model exists under stricter…
A zero-sum two-person Perfect Information Semi-Markov game (PISMG) under limiting ratio average payoff has a value and both the maximiser and the minimiser have optimal pure semi-stationary strategies. We arrive at the result by first…
Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum games have two players -- one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to minimize it. The associated decision problem, "Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve, for…
We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that…
We consider a popular model of microeconomics with countably many assets: the Arbitrage Pricing Model. We study the problem of optimal investment under an expected utility criterion and look for conditions ensuring the existence of optimal…
This paper investigates the robust {non-zero-sum} games in an aggregated {overfunded} defined benefit (abbr. DB) pension plan. The sponsoring firm is concerned with the investment performance of the fund surplus while the participants act…
This paper investigates mixed strategies in dynamic games with perfect information. We present an example to show that a player may obtain higher payoff by playing mixed strategy. By contrast, the main result of the paper shows that every…
We study multi-player games with perfect information and general payoff function, where the set of stages is the set of non-positive integers $\{\ldots,-2,-1,0\}$. We define two related equilibrium concepts: one considering only deviations…
We consider two-player non zero-sum infinite duration games played on weighted graphs. We extend the notion of secure equilibrium introduced by Chatterjee et al., from the Boolean setting to this quantitative setting. As for the Boolean…
This paper examines finite zero-sum stochastic games and demonstrates that when the game's duration is sufficiently long, there exists a pair of approximately optimal strategies such that the expected average payoff at any point in the game…
The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…
We consider a sub-class of bi-matrix games which we refer to as two-person (hereafter referred to as two-player) additively-separable sum (TPASS) games, where the sum of the pay-offs of the two players is additively separable. The row…
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has…
We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. It is well-known that this class of games admits equilibria in pure, as well as mixed strategies, and much of the literature has focused on the latter. We show…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
We prove existence of a value for two-player zero-sum stopper vs. singular-controller games on finite-time horizon, when the underlying dynamics is one-dimensional, diffusive and bound to evolve in $[0,\infty)$. We show that the value is…
Negotiation is a very common interaction between automated agents. Many common negotiation protocols work with cardinal utilities, even though ordinal preferences, which only rank the outcomes, are easier to elicit from humans. In this work…
We study the most famous example of a large financial market: the Arbitrage Pricing Model, where investors can trade in a one-period setting with countably many assets admitting a factor structure. We consider the problem of maximising…
In this paper we introduce the discontinuous universal feedback for the problem of Nash equilibrium in two person non-zero sum differential game. We assume that there exist functions satisfying some conditions analogous to the infinitesimal…
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…