Related papers: An Analysis of Dual-Issue Final-Offer Arbitration
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Focusing on two major classes of valuations, namely…
In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum differential game in the case where a payoff is determined by the exit time, that is, the first time when the system leaves the game domain. Additionally, we assume that a part of domain's boundary is…
We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.
In this paper, we study a game with positive or plus infinite expectation and determine the optimal proportion of investment for maximizing the limit expectation of growth rate per attempt. With this objective, we introduce a new pricing…
In this paper, we address an instance of uniquely solvable mean-field game with a common noise whose corresponding counterpart without common noise has several equilibria. We study the selection problem for this mean-field game without…
In this paper I present several algorithmic techniques for improving the decision process of multiple types of agents behaving in environments where their interests are in conflict. The interactions between the agents are modelled by using…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
In a Markovian model for a financial market, we characterize the best arbitrage with respect to the market portfolio that can be achieved using nonanticipative investment strategies, in terms of the smallest positive solution to a parabolic…
In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in…
In this paper, we present a quantum version of some portions of Mathematical Finance, including theory of arbitrage, asset pricing, and optional decomposition in financial markets based on finite dimensional quantum probability spaces. As…
We investigate Pareto equilibria for bi-objective optimal control problems. Our framework comprises the situation in which an agent acts with a distributed control in a portion of a given domain, and aims to achieve two distinct (possibly…
This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player…
We study risk-sharing economies where heterogenous agents trade subject to quadratic transaction costs. The corresponding equilibrium asset prices and trading strategies are characterised by a system of nonlinear, fully-coupled…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
In this paper, we introduce an abstract fuzzy economy (generalized fuzzy game) model with a countable space of actions and we study the existence of the fuzzy equilibrium. As applications, two types of results are obtained. The first ones…
This short note demonstrates how one can define a transformation of a non-zero sum game into a zero sum, so that the optimal mixed strategy achieving equilibrium always exists. The transformation is equivalent to introduction of a passive…
In this paper a finite discrete time market with an arbitrary state space and bid-ask spreads is considered. The notion of an equivalent bid-ask martingale measure (EBAMM) is introduced and the fundamental theorem of asset pricing is proved…
We consider a partially asymmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. All but one players have the same payoff functions, and one player (Player $n$) does not. Two strategic variables are $t_i$'s and $s_i$'s for each…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…