Related papers: Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts

We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in many-to-many matching markets when only path-independence on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we first show that the sets of firm-quasi-stable and…

The transient fluctuation of the prosperity of firms in a network economy is investigated with an abstract stochastic model. The model describes the profit which firms make when they sell materials to a firm which produces a product and the…

The concept of stability has a long history in the field of dynamical systems: stable invariant objects are the ones that would be expected to be observed in experiments and numerical simulations. Heteroclinic networks are invariant objects…

We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…

We propose a generalized market equilibrium model using assignment game criteria for evaluating transportation systems that consist of both operators' and users' decisions. The model finds stable pricing, in terms of generalized costs, and…

We analyze an optimal trade execution problem in a financial market with stochastic liquidity. To this end we set up a limit order book model in which both order book depth and resilience evolve randomly in time. Trading is allowed in both…

In a stable matching setting, we consider a query model that allows for an interactive learning algorithm to make precisely one type of query: proposing a matching, the response to which is either that the proposed matching is stable, or a…

This paper studies contracting in the presence of externalities with a non-contractible outsider. Multiple equilibria arise from strategic symmetry between the insider agent and the outsider. To address strategic uncertainty, the principal…

When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…

Outcome-only evaluation can certify economically unsafe agents: a policy can hit a business KPI while violating deployable behavioral discipline. In hotel pricing with hidden competitor state, a learner can achieve plausible revenue per…

The existence of instabilities, for example in the form of adversarial examples, has given rise to a highly active area of research concerning itself with understanding and enhancing the stability of neural networks. We focus on a popular…

We identify a trade-off between robustness and accuracy that serves as a guiding principle in the design of defenses against adversarial examples. Although this problem has been widely studied empirically, much remains unknown concerning…

We propose a dynamic network model where two mechanisms control the probability of a link between two nodes: (i) the existence or absence of this link in the past, and (ii) node-specific latent variables (dynamic fitnesses) describing the…

We initiate the study of deep learning for the automated design of two-sided matching mechanisms. What is of most interest is to use machine learning to understand the possibility of new tradeoffs between strategy-proofness and stability.…

In discrete matching markets, substitutes and complements can be unidirectional between two groups of workers when members of one group are more important or competent than those of the other group for firms. We show that a stable matching…

We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…

Two-stage bipartite matching is a fundamental problem of optimization under uncertainty introduced by Feng, Niazadeh, and Saberi (2021), who study it under the stochastic and adversarial paradigms of uncertainty. We propose a method to…

Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both…

In barter exchanges, participants directly trade their endowed goods in a constrained economic setting without money. Transactions in barter exchanges are often facilitated via a central clearinghouse that must match participants even in…