Related papers: Avoiding Contradictions in the Paradoxes, the Halt…
In this paper we discuss contrastive explanations for formal argumentation - the question why a certain argument (the fact) can be accepted, whilst another argument (the foil) cannot be accepted under various extension-based semantics. The…
Given a three-valued definition of validity, which choice of three-valued truth tables for the connectives can ensure that the resulting logic coincides exactly with classical logic? We give an answer to this question for the five monotonic…
A new computational method that uses polynomial equations and dynamical systems to evaluate logical propositions is introduced and applied to Goedel's incompleteness theorems. The truth value of a logical formula subject to a set of axioms…
This article informally presents a solution to the paradoxes of truth and shows how the solution solves classical paradoxes (such as the original Liar) as well as the paradoxes that were invented as counterarguments for various proposed…
We describe a graph-theoretic syntax for self-referential formulas as well as a four-valued logic to include contradictory and independent formulas. We then explore the degree to which generalized truth tables can be realized in our theory,…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…
It is well known that the resolution method (for propositional logic) is complete. However, completeness proofs found in the literature use an argument by contradiction showing that if a set of clauses is unsatisfiable, then it must have a…
The concept of paradeduction is presented in order to justify that we can overlook contradictory information taking into account only what is consistent. Besides that, paradeduction is used to show that there is a way to transform any…
How can we reason around logical paradoxes without falling into them? This paper introduces grounded deduction or GD, a Kripke-inspired approach to first-order logic and arithmetic that is neither classical nor intuitionistic, but…
This paper argues that, insofar as we doubt the bivalence of the Continuum Hypothesis or the truth of the Axiom of Choice, we should also doubt the consistency of third-order arithmetic, both the classical and intuitionistic versions.…
Modern Logics, as formulated notably by Frege, Russell and Tarski involved basic assumptions about Natural Languages in general and Indo-European Languages in particular, which are contested by Linguists. Based upon those assumptions,…
We present a framework which allows a uniform approach to the recently introduced concept of pseudo-repetitions on words in the morphic case. This framework is at the same time more general and simpler. We introduce the concept of a…
We analyze the informal notion of truth and conclude that it can be formalized in essentially two distinct ways: constructively, in terms of provability, or classically, as a hierarchy of concepts which satisfy Tarski's biconditional in…
Type-free systems of logic are designed to consistently handle significant instances of self-reference. Some consistent type-free systems also have the feature of allowing the sort of general abstraction or comprehension principle that…
I outline a new theory of truth that resolves the classical and constructive versions of the liar paradox. The theory features a provably consistent axiomatization of a global self-applicative truth predicate. Truth is defined using…
We present a novel treatment of set theory in a four-valued paraconsistent and paracomplete logic, i.e., a logic in which propositions can be both true and false, and neither true nor false. Our approach is a significant departure from…
An ultimate universal theory -- a complete theory that accounts, via few and simple first principles, for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed -- has been, and still is, the aspiration of most physicists and…
Two types of approximation to the paradoxical Russell Set are presented, one approximating it from below, one from above. It is shown that any lower approximation gives rise to a better approximation containing it, and that any upper…
We acuminate the idea of a final theory of physics in order to analyze its logical implications and consequences. It is argued that the rationale of a final theory is the principle of sufficient reason. This implies that a final theory of…
Counterfactual definiteness must be used as at least one of the postulates or axioms that are necessary to derive Bell-type inequalities. It is considered by many to be a postulate that is not only commensurate with classical physics (as…