English

G\"odel's incompleteness theorem and universal physics theories

History and Philosophy of Physics 2021-03-24 v3

Abstract

An ultimate universal theory -- a complete theory that accounts, via few and simple first principles, for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed -- has been, and still is, the aspiration of most physicists and scientists. Yet, a basic principle that is embodied in the results of G\"{o}del's incompleteness theorems is that self-referencing leads to logical conflict or failure, as in the liar paradox or Russell's paradox. In physics theories self-referencing necessarily occurs when it is realized that the observer is also a participant in the experienced phenomena -- we, humans, are part of the universe while observing it. Therefore self-referencing, and consequently logical conflicts, are unavoidable, and any theory pretending to be universal is bound to be incomplete.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.1906.02724,
  title  = {G\"odel's incompleteness theorem and universal physics theories},
  author = {Uri Ben-Ya'acov},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.02724},
  year   = {2021}
}

Comments

12 pages, 1 figure

R2 v1 2026-06-23T09:45:51.459Z