Related papers: Boolean Hedonic Games
Every simple game is a monotone Boolean function. For the other direction we just have to exclude the two constant functions. The enumeration of monotone Boolean functions with distinguishable variables is also known as the Dedekind's…
Past efforts to classify impartial three-player combinatorial games (the theories of Li and Straffin) have made various restrictive assumptions about the rationality of one's opponents and the formation and behavior of coalitions. One may…
With the development of artificial intelligence, human beings are increasingly interested in human-agent collaboration, which generates a series of problems about the relationship between agents and humans, such as trust and cooperation.…
We show that any cooperative game can be represented by an assignment of costly facilities to players, in which it is intuitively obvious how to allocate the total cost in an equitable manner. This equitable solution turns out to be the…
We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which…
We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…
This article introduces differential hybrid games, which combine differential games with hybrid games. In both kinds of games, two players interact with continuous dynamics. The difference is that hybrid games also provide all the features…
This paper proposes Hodge Potential Choice (HPC), a new solution for abstract games with irreflexive dominance relations. This solution is formulated by involving geometric tools like differential forms and Hodge decomposition onto abstract…
We study discrete preference games in heterogeneous social networks. These games model the interplay between a player's private belief and his/her publicly stated opinion (which could be different from the player's belief) as a strategic…
Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying…
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
We use the example of playing a 2-player game with entangled quantum objects to investigate the effect of quantum correlation. We find that for simple game scenarios it is classical correlation that is the central feature and that these…
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…
Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size, prescribed by social…
This article deals with classes of antagonistic games with two players. A game is specified in terms of two `hostile' stochastic processes representing mutual attacks upon random times exerting casualties of random magnitudes. The game ends…
In recent years, agents have become capable of communicating seamlessly via natural language and navigating in environments that involve cooperation and competition, a fact that can introduce social dilemmas. Due to the interleaving of…
Fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) encode rich task-specific features, but the form of these representations, especially within MLP layers, remains unclear. Empirical inspection of LoRA updates shows that new features concentrate in…
The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
An independent set game is a cooperative game defined on graphs and dealing with profit-sharing in maximum independent set problems. A population monotonic allocation scheme is a rule specifying how to share the profit of each coalition…