Related papers: Are there any nicely structured preference~profile…
Many hard computational social choice problems are known to become tractable when voters' preferences belong to a restricted domain, such as those of single-peaked or single-crossing preferences. However, to date, all algorithmic results of…
Incomplete preferences are likely to arise in real-world preference aggregation scenarios. This paper deals with determining whether an incomplete preference profile is single-peaked. This is valuable information since many intractable…
Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting rules are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to…
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked, single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the structure makes it easier to reason about preferences, and…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
A preference system $\mathcal{I}$ is an undirected graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, and $\mathcal{I}$ admits a master list if all preferences can be derived from a single ordering over all vertices. We study the…
A preference profile is single-peaked on a tree if the candidate set can be equipped with a tree structure so that the preferences of each voter are decreasing from their top candidate along all paths in the tree. This notion was introduced…
Eliciting the preferences of a set of agents over a set of alternatives is a problem of fundamental importance in social choice theory. Prior work on this problem has studied the query complexity of preference elicitation for the…
Many real life optimization problems contain both hard and soft constraints, as well as qualitative conditional preferences. However, there is no single formalism to specify all three kinds of information. We therefore propose a framework,…
Studying complexity of various bribery problems has been one of the main research focus in computational social choice. In all the models of bribery studied so far, the briber has to pay every voter some amount of money depending on what…
In elections, a set of candidates ranked consecutively (though possibly in different order) by all voters is called a clone set, and its members are called clones. A clone structure is a family of all clone sets of a given election. In this…
In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…
We study the computational complexity of explaining preference data through Boolean attribute models (BAMs), motivated by extensive research involving attribute models and their promise in understanding preference structure and enabling…
We systematically investigate the complexity of model checking the existential positive fragment of first-order logic. In particular, for a set of existential positive sentences, we consider model checking where the sentence is restricted…
A structure called a decision making problem is considered. The set of outcomes (consequences) is partially ordered according to the decision maker's preferences. The problem is how these preferences affect a decision maker to prefer one of…
The way that people make choices or exhibit preferences can be strongly affected by the set of available alternatives, often called the choice set. Furthermore, there are usually heterogeneous preferences, either at an individual level…
Constructive election control considers the problem of an adversary who seeks to sway the outcome of an electoral process in order to ensure that their favored candidate wins. We consider the computational problem of constructive election…
We characterize one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles with a small number of alternatives and voters. In particular, we show the following. 1. Every preference profile with up to two voters is one-dimensional Euclidean if and only…
We study single-candidate voting embedded in a metric space, where both voters and candidates are points in the space, and the distances between voters and candidates specify the voters' preferences over candidates. In the voting, each…