Related papers: Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to…
We prove a theorem computing the number of solutions to a system of equations which is generic subject to the sparsity conditions embodied in a graph. We apply this theorem to games obeying graphical models and to extensive-form games. We…
Motivated by the sequence form formulation of Koller et al. (GEB'96), this paper defines {\em bilinear games}, and proposes efficient algorithms for its rank based subclasses. Bilinear games are two-player non-cooperative single-shot games…
We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…
Several problems in planning and reactive synthesis can be reduced to the analysis of two-player quantitative graph games. {\em Optimization} is one form of analysis. We argue that in many cases it may be better to replace the optimization…
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…
In this work, an abstract and general language for the fundamental objects underlying dynamic games under probabilistic uncertainty is developed. Combining the theory of decision trees by Al\'os-Ferrer--Ritzberger (2005) and a Harsanyian…
This paper considers the design of fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking strategies for multi-agent games. To develop fully distributed seeking strategies, two adaptive control laws, including a node-based control law and an edge-based…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
The semigroup game is a two-person zero-sum game defined on a semigroup S as follows: Players 1 and 2 choose elements x and y in S, respectively, and player 1 receives a payoff f(xy) defined by a function f from S to [-1,1]. If the…
Shapley's discounted stochastic games, Everett's recursive games and Gillette's undiscounted stochastic games are classical models of game theory describing two-player zero-sum games of potentially infinite duration. We describe algorithms…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which…
This paper contains a reformulation of any $n$-player finite, static game into a framework of distributed, dynamical system based on agents' payoff-based deviations. The reformulation generalizes the method employed in the second part of…
When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in…
We consider a two-player search game on a tree $T$. One vertex (unknown to the players) is randomly selected as the target. The players alternately guess vertices. If a guess $v$ is not the target, then both players are informed in which…
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…
We study the value and the optimal strategies for a two-player zero-sum optimal stopping game with incomplete and asymmetric information. In our Bayesian set-up, the drift of the underlying diffusion process is unknown to one player…
We study the computation of Nash equilibria in a two-player normal form game from the perspective of parameterized complexity. Recent results proved hardness for a number of variants, when parameterized by the support size. We complement…
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. This equilibrium concept refines the Nash equilibrium requiring resilience w.r.t. a specific vanishing perturbation (representing mistakes of…