Related papers: Random Extensive Form Games and its Application to…

We address the problem of how cooperative (altruistic-like) behavior arises in natural and social systems by analyzing an ultimatum game in complex networks. Specifically, three types of players are considered: (a) empathetic, whose…

This paper proves several Tauberian theorems for general iterations of operators, and provides two applications to zero-sum stochastic games where the total payoff is a weighted sum of the stage payoffs. The first application is to provide…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…

In this paper, we study the distribution of the number of internal equilibria of a multi-player two-strategy random evolutionary game. Using techniques from the random polynomial theory, we obtain a closed formula for the probability that…

We study infinite asymptotic games in Banach spaces with an F.D.D. and prove that analytic games are determined by characterising precisely the conditions for the players to have winning strategies. These results are applied to characterise…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

We introduce a simple extensive-form algorithm for finding equilibria of two-player, zero-sum games. The algorithm is realization equivalent to a generalized form of Fictitious Play. We compare its performance to that of a similar…

Winners-take-all situations introduce an incentive for agents to diversify their behavior, since doing so will result in splitting an eventual price with fewer people. At the same time, when the payoff of a process depends on a parameter…

Evolution of distribution of strategies in game theory is an interesting question that has been studied only for specific cases. Here I develop a general method to extend analysis of the evolution of continuous strategy distributions given…

The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…

Colonel Blotto games with discrete strategy spaces effectively illustrate the intricate nature of multidimensional strategic reasoning. This paper studies the equilibrium set of such games where, in line with prior experimental work, the…

The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the payoff that follows a probability density. Most of our assumptions…

In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…

This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…

Merging asymptotic expansions of arbitrary length are established for the distribution functions and for the probabilities of suitably centered and normalized cumulative winnings in a full sequence of generalized St. Petersburg games,…

We study a simple adaptive model in the framework of an N -player normal form game. The model consists of a repeated game where the players only know their own action space and their own payoff scored at each stage, not those of the other…

This paper characterizes differentiable subgame perfect equilibria in a continuous time intertemporal decision optimization problem with non-constant discounting. The equilibrium equation takes two different forms, one of which is…

Turn-based discounted-sum games are two-player zero-sum games played on finite directed graphs. The vertices of the graph are partitioned between player 1 and player 2. Plays are infinite walks on the graph where the next vertex is decided…