Related papers: Stable Matching with Evolving Preferences
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
In many-to-many matching models, substitutable preferences constitute the largest domain for which a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. In this note, we extend the recently proposed algorithm of Hatfield et al. [3] to test…
This paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched with possibly more than one individual. The matching market contains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. First, we show by means of an example that a…
We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some students apply, and a first (stable) matching $M_1$ has to be…
The stable roommates problem with $n$ agents has worst case complexity $O(n^2)$ in time and space. Random instances can be solved faster and with less memory, however. We introduce an algorithm that has average time and space complexity…
The stable marriage problem requires one to find a marriage with no blocking pair. Given a matching that is not stable, Roth and Vande Vate have shown that there exists a sequence of matchings that leads to a stable matching in which each…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of…
This paper describes the transition of a male-pessimal matching set to optimal when it is a man-oriented approach by deleting a pair from matching set considering the score based approach. A descriptive explanation of the proposed algorithm…
Given a set of $n$ men represented by $n$ points lying on a line, and $n$ women represented by $n$ points lying on another parallel line, with each person having a list that ranks some people of opposite gender as his/her acceptable…
We study the evolution of preferences in multi-population settings that allow matches across distinct populations. Each individual has subjective preferences over potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
The balance between convergence and diversity is a key issue of evolutionary multi-objective optimization. The recently proposed stable matching-based selection provides a new perspective to handle this balance under the framework of…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different "gender" (this is Stable Marriage) or…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…