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We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
Many security and other real-world situations are dynamic in nature and can be modelled as strictly competitive (or zero-sum) dynamic games. In these domains, agents perform actions to affect the environment and receive observations --…
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…
We propose a new algorithm for a broad class of periodic time-varying Stochastic Game-Theoretic Riccati Differential Equations arising in Zero-Sum Linear-Quadratic Stochastic Differential Games. The algorithm is constructed via dual-layer…
We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme for two-strategy anonymous games, in which the players' utility functions, although potentially different, do not differentiate among the identities of the other players. Our algorithm…
In this work we offer an $O(|V|^2 |E|\, W)$ pseudo-polynomial time deterministic algorithm for solving the Value Problem and Optimal Strategy Synthesis in Mean Payoff Games. This improves by a factor $\log(|V|\, W)$ the best previously…
We study a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, namely, stochastic games with independent chains and unknown transition matrices. In this class of games, players control their own internal Markov chains whose transitions do not depend…
This paper studies a class of stationary mean-field games of singular stochastic control with regime-switching. The representative agent adjusts the dynamics of a Markov-modulated It\^o-diffusion via a two-sided singular stochastic control…
We study turn-based stochastic zero-sum games with lexicographic preferences over reachability and safety objectives. Stochastic games are standard models in control, verification, and synthesis of stochastic reactive systems that exhibit…
We consider a general nonzero-sum impulse game with two players. The main mathematical contribution of the paper is a verification theorem which provides, under some regularity conditions, a suitable system of quasi-variational inequalities…
Shapley's discounted stochastic games, Everett's recursive games and Gillette's undiscounted stochastic games are classical models of game theory describing two-player zero-sum games of potentially infinite duration. We describe algorithms…
This paper considers mean field games in a multi-agent Markov decision process (MDP) framework. Each player has a continuum state and binary action, and benefits from the improvement of the condition of the overall population. Based on an…
In this paper, we study the two-facility location game on a line with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his…
This work considers two-player zero-sum semi-Markov games with incomplete information on one side and perfect observation. At the beginning, the system selects a game type according to a given probability distribution and informs to Player…
This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
The study of learning in games typically assumes that each player always has access to all of their actions. However, in many practical scenarios, players' available actions might be restricted due to exogenous stochasticity. To model this…
Shapley (1953) introduced two-player zero-sum discounted stochastic games, henceforth stochastic games, a model where a state variable follows a two-controlled Markov chain, the players receive rewards at each stage which add up to $0$, and…
The paper is concerned with a zero-sum continuous-time stochastic differential game with a dynamics controlled by a Markov process and a terminal payoff. The value function of the original game is estimated using the value function of a…
The distributed computation of equilibria and optima has seen growing interest in a broad collection of networked problems. We consider the computation of equilibria of convex stochastic Nash games characterized by a possibly nonconvex…