Related papers: Setting Lower Bounds on Truthfulness
We study the budget aggregation problem in which a set of strategic voters must split a finite divisible resource (such as money or time) among a set of competing projects. Our goal is twofold: We seek truthful mechanisms that provide…
We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the domain of scheduling $n$ unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just one machine is submodular. For the scheduling problem with…
We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as…
We study the makespan minimization problem with unrelated selfish machines under the assumption that job sizes are stochastic. We design simple truthful mechanisms that under various distributional assumptions provide constant and…
We present the first nontrivial procedure for configuring heuristic algorithms to maximize the utility provided to their end users while also offering theoretical guarantees about performance. Existing procedures seek configurations that…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
Consider the many shared resource scheduling problem where jobs have to be scheduled on identical parallel machines with the goal of minimizing the makespan. However, each job needs exactly one additional shared resource in order to be…
This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of…
We provide lower error bounds for randomized algorithms that approximate integrals of functions depending on an unrestricted or even infinite number of variables. More precisely, we consider the infinite-dimensional integration problem on…
We provide polynomial-time approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms for makespan minimization on unrelated machines as well as for max-min fair allocations of indivisible goods, with approximation factors of $2$ and $\min\{m-k+1,…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
We study how to utilize (possibly erroneous) predictions in a model for computing under uncertainty in which an algorithm can query unknown data. Our aim is to minimize the number of queries needed to solve the minimum spanning tree…
We present a technique of proving lower bounds for noisy computations. This is achieved by a theorem connecting computations on a kind of randomized decision trees and sampling based algorithms. This approach is surprisingly powerful, and…
We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using {\em Proportional Fairness} as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents while incentivizing…
In this paper, we introduce a method for approximating the solution to inference and optimization tasks in uncertain and deterministic reasoning. Such tasks are in general intractable for exact algorithms because of the large number of…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use…
We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to…
We consider variants of the restricted assignment problem where a set of jobs has to be assigned to a set of machines, for each job a size and a set of eligible machines is given, and the jobs may only be assigned to eligible machines with…