Related papers: Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assign…

We study the fair division of divisible bad resources with strategic agents who can manipulate their private information to get a better allocation. Within certain constraints, we are particularly interested in whether truthful envy-free…

We address the problem of model-free distributed stabilization of heterogeneous multi-agent systems using reinforcement learning (RL). Two algorithms are developed. The first algorithm solves a centralized linear quadratic regulator (LQR)…

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents…

The framework of decision-making, modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), typically assumes a single objective. However, practical scenarios often involve tradeoffs between multiple objectives. We address this in the Linear Quadratic…

We study the problem of transfer-learning in the setting of stochastic linear bandit tasks. We consider that a low dimensional linear representation is shared across the tasks, and study the benefit of learning this representation in the…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items to agents with different entitlements, which captures, for example, the distribution of ministries among political parties in a coalition government. Our focus is on picking…

Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…

In a strategy-proof mechanism, the influence of an agent may be measured as the set of outcomes an agent can bring about by varying her (reported) type. More specifically, we refer to an agent's influence on her own relevant outcomes as her…

Deployed language and vision-language models must decide, on each input, whether to answer directly, retrieve evidence, defer to a stronger model, or abstain. Contrary to the common monotonicity intuition, greater per-input expressivity is…

Quadratic Voting (QV) is a social choice mechanism that addresses the "tyranny of the majority" of one-person-one-vote mechanisms. Agents express not only their preference ordering but also their preference intensity by purchasing $x$ votes…

Time-inconsistent preferences, where agents favor smaller-sooner over larger-later rewards, are a key feature of human and animal decision-making. Quasi-Hyperbolic (QH) discounting provides a simple yet powerful model for this behavior, but…

Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…

We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior of the…

We consider a stochastic multi-armed bandit setting where reward must be actively queried for it to be observed. We provide tight lower and upper problem-dependent guarantees on both the regret and the number of queries. Interestingly, we…

We study the classical assignment problem with initial endowments in a probabilistic framework. In this setting, each agent initially owns an object and has strict preferences over the entire set of objects, and the goal is to reassign…

Recent work has formalized the reward hypothesis through the lens of expected utility theory, by interpreting reward as utility. Hausner's foundational work showed that dropping the continuity axiom leads to a generalization of expected…

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness…

We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which guarantees that the two sides be treated symmetrically. All…

Peer reviews, evaluations, and selections are a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals from those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection,…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair manner. While envy-free allocations of indivisible goods are not guaranteed to exist, envy-freeness can be achieved by additionally providing some subsidy to the…