Related papers: Strategyproof Quota Mechanisms for Multiple Assign…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in assignment mechanisms.…
In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…
We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties…
This paper establishes non-asymptotic convergence of the cutoffs in Random serial dictatorship in an environment with many students, many schools, and arbitrary student preferences. Convergence is shown to hold when the number of schools,…
We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
Several resource allocation problems involve multiple types of resources, with a different agency being responsible for "locally" allocating the resources of each type, while a central planner wishes to provide a guarantee on the properties…
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as the only rule that avoids justified envy under standard direct…
We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is…
We consider the facility location problem in a metric space, focusing on the case of three agents. We show that selecting the reported location of each agent with probability proportional to the distance between the other two agents results…
Serial dictatorship is a simple mechanism for coordinating agents in solving combinatorial optimization problems according to their preferences. The most representative such problem is one-sided matching, in which a set of n agents have…
We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of incentive compatibility (strategy-proofness), Pareto…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal preferences (possibly involving ties) over a subset of the…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
We study the problem of assigning objects to agents in the presence of arbitrary linear constraints when agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our main contribution is the generalization of the (Extended) Probabilistic…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
Fairness is well studied in the context of resource allocation. Researchers have proposed various fairness notions like envy-freeness (EF), and its relaxations, proportionality and max-min share (MMS). There is vast literature on the…
We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms. We use approximate strategyproofness to define manipulability, a measure to…