Related papers: Games with Delays. A Frankenstein Approach
In this paper, we consider a mean field game model inspired by crowd motion where agents aim to reach a closed set, called target set, in minimal time. Congestion phenomena are modeled through a constraint on the velocity of an agent that…
We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…
This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…
This paper is concerned with a non-zero sum differential game problem of an anticipated forward-backward stochastic differential delayed equation under partial information. We establish a necessary maximum principle and sufficient…
Zero-sum Markov Stackelberg games can be used to model myriad problems, in domains ranging from economics to human robot interaction. In this paper, we develop policy gradient methods that solve these games in continuous state and action…
We consider an n-player symmetric stochastic game with weak interaction between the players. Time is continuous and the horizon and the number of states are finite. We show that the value function of each of the players can be approximated…
Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…
Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable…
We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of $n \geq 2$ identical players has a single information packet that she wants to transmit using one of $k \geq…
Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a…
Deception plays a crucial role in strategic interactions with incomplete information. Motivated by security applications, we study a class of two-player turn-based deterministic games with one-sided incomplete information, in which player 1…
We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\epsilon, \gamma)$-differential privacy, that…
Mean Field Game systems describe equilibrium configurations in differential games with infinitely many infinitesimal interacting agents. We introduce a learning procedure (similar to the Fictitious Play) for these games and show its…
Physical systems can fail. For this reason the problem of identifying and reacting to faults has received a large attention in the control and computer science communities. In this paper we study the fault diagnosis problem for hybrid…
Competitive games involving thousands or even millions of players are prevalent in real-world contexts, such as transportation, communications, and computer networks. However, learning in these large-scale multi-agent environments presents…
When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…
This paper investigates online distributed aggregative games with time-varying cost functions, where agents are interconnected through an unbalanced communication graph. Due to the distributed and noncooperative nature of the game, some…
We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…
Considering linear-quadratic discrete-time games with unknown input/output/state (i/o/s) dynamics and state, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of feedback Nash equilibria (FNE) in the…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…