Related papers: On the computational complexity of evolution
In this paper, we study a two-stage stochastic version of the assignment game, which is a fundamental cooperative game. Given an initial setting, the set of players may change in the second stage according to some probability distribution,…
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…
The $\varepsilon$-well-supported Nash equilibrium is a strong notion of approximation of a Nash equilibrium, where no player has an incentive greater than $\varepsilon$ to deviate from any of the pure strategies that she uses in her mixed…
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…
We prove that deciding whether a given input word contains as subsequence every possible permutation of integers $\{1,2,\ldots,n\}$ is coNP-complete. The coNP-completeness holds even when given the guarantee that the input word contains as…
Determining a Nash equilibrium in a $2$-player non-zero sum game is known to be PPAD-hard (Chen and Deng (2006), Chen, Deng and Teng (2009)). The problem, even when restricted to win-lose bimatrix games, remains PPAD-hard (Abbott, Kane and…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an…
We formulate and analyze a general class of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information arising in dynamic systems. In such games, multiple strategic agents control the system dynamics and have different information about the…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…
We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…
We consider (i) the problem of finding a (possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium in congestion games, and (ii) the problem of finding an (exponential precision) fixed point of the gradient descent dynamics of a smooth function $f:[0,1]^n…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Leadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
We investigate the long-run behavior of a stochastic replicator process, which describes game dynamics for a symmetric two-player game under aggregate shocks. We establish an averaging principle that relates time averages of the process and…
We show that the BIMATRIX game does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme, unless PPAD is in P. In other words, no algorithm with time polynomial in n and 1/\epsilon can compute an \epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium of an…