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We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
Many countries around the world, including Korea, use the school choice lottery system. However, this method has a problem in that many students are assigned to less-preferred schools based on the lottery results. In addition, the task of…
The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates: each agent ranks all others in strict order of preference. A solution to SR is then a partition of the agents into pairs so that…
Stable matching in a community consisting of $N$ men and $N$ women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
Colloquially, there are two groups, $n$ men and $n$ women, each man (woman) ranking women (men) as potential marriage partners. A complete matching is called stable if no unmatched pair prefer each other to their partners in the matching.…
In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability…
Reward fine-tuning of diffusion and flow models and sampling from tilted or Boltzmann distributions can both be formulated as stochastic optimal control (SOC) problems, where learning an optimal generative dynamics corresponds to optimizing…
Consider the standard hospitals/residents problem, or the two-sided many-to-one stable matching problem, and assume that the true preference lists of both sides are complete and strict. The lists actually submitted, however, are truncated.…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
The matching problem plays a basic role in combinatorial optimization and in statistical mechanics. In its stochastic variants, optimization decisions have to be taken given only some probabilistic information about the instance. While the…
In this paper we study the fine-grained complexity of finding exact and approximate solutions to problems in P. Our main contribution is showing reductions from exact to approximate solution for a host of such problems. As one (notable)…
Many problems of interest in computer vision can be formulated as a problem of finding consistent correspondences between two feature sets. Feature correspondence (matching) problem with one-to-one mapping constraint is usually formulated…
We study robust convex quadratic programs where the uncertain problem parameters can contain both continuous and integer components. Under the natural boundedness assumption on the uncertainty set, we show that the generic problems are…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
We present new integer linear programming (ILP) models for NP-hard optimisation problems in instances of the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete lists (SMTI) and its many-to-one generalisation, the Hospitals / Residents problem…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with preferences over Projects (SPA-P) involves sets of students, projects and lecturers, where the students and lecturers each have preferences over the projects. In this context, we typically seek a…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
Consider the group of $n$ men and $n$ women, each with their own preference list for a potential marriage partner. The stable marriage is a bipartite matching such that no unmatched pair (man, woman) prefer each other to their partners in…