Related papers: Econometrics for Learning Agents
In network formation games, agents form edges with each other to maximize their utility. Each agent's utility depends on its private beliefs and its edges in the network. Strategic agents can misrepresent their beliefs to get a better…
In Keynesian Beauty Contests notably modeled by p-guessing games, players try to guess the average of guesses multiplied by p. Convergence of plays to Nash equilibrium has often been justified by agents' learning. However, interrogations…
Fictitious play is a popular learning algorithm in which players that utilize the history of actions played by the players and the knowledge of their own payoff matrix can converge to the Nash equilibrium under certain conditions on the…
We focus on online second price auctions, where bids are made sequentially, and the winning bidder pays the maximum of the second-highest bid and a seller specified starting price. For many such auctions, the seller does not see all the…
We introduce a new hypothesis testing-based learning dynamics in which players update their strategies by combining hypothesis testing with utility-driven exploration. In this dynamics, each player forms beliefs about opponents' strategies…
This paper considers a game-theoretic framework for distributed machine learning problems over networks where the information acquisition at a node is modeled as a rational choice of a player. In the proposed game, players decide both the…
Equilibrium computation in markets usually considers settings where player valuation functions are known. We consider the setting where player valuations are unknown; using a PAC learning-theoretic framework, we analyze some classes of…
Learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions is a fundamental problem at the interface of game theory and machine learning, which has seen a recent surge in interest due to the transition of display advertising to first-price auctions.…
Data is the central commodity of the digital economy. Unlike physical goods, it is non-rival, replicable at near-zero cost, and traded under heterogeneous licensing rules. These properties defy standard supply--demand theory and call for…
Our paper concerns the computation of Nash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values. While there exist several equilibrium computation methods for auctions with independent values, the correlation of the bidders' values…
We consider the problem of learning Nash equilibrial policies for two-player risk-sensitive collision-avoiding interactions. Solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equations of such general-sum differential games in real time is an open…
Robots deployed to the real world must be able to interact with other agents in their environment. Dynamic game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework for modeling scenarios in which agents have individual objectives and…
Model-free learning for multi-agent stochastic games is an active area of research. Existing reinforcement learning algorithms, however, are often restricted to zero-sum games, and are applicable only in small state-action spaces or other…
The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) induces a critical vulnerability: the potential for dishonest manipulation by service providers. This manipulation can manifest in…
We consider an inventory competition game between two firms. The question we address is this: If players do not know the opponent's action and opponent's utility function can they learn to play the Nash policy in a repeated game by…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…
The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…
It is well known that reinforcement learning can be cast as inference in an appropriate probabilistic model. However, this commonly involves introducing a distribution over agent trajectories with probabilities proportional to exponentiated…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…