Related papers: Allocating Indivisible Items in Categorized Domain…
In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…
One cannot make truly fair decisions using integer linear programs unless one controls the selection probabilities of the (possibly many) optimal solutions. For this purpose, we propose a unified framework when binary decision variables…
In decentralized stochastic control (or stochastic team theory) and game theory, if there is a pre-defined order in a system in which agents act, the system is called \textit{sequential}, otherwise it is non-sequential. Much of the…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
We initiate the study of parallel algorithms for fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive preferences. We give fast parallel algorithms for various fundamental problems, such as finding a Pareto Optimal and EF1…
We propose a decentralized auction-based algorithm for the solution of dynamic task allocation problems for spatially distributed multi-agent systems. In our approach, each member of the multi-agent team is assigned to at most one task from…
Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs) are a frequently used framework in which a set of independent agents choose values from their respective discrete domains to maximize their utility. Although this formulation is typically…
I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the…
Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an \textit{subjective identity} and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. The…
The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics…
The sequential allocation protocol is a simple and popular mechanism to allocate indivisible goods, in which the agents take turns to pick the items according to a predefined sequence. While this protocol is not strategy-proof, it has been…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods, among agents, under cardinality constraints and additive valuations. In this setting, we are given a partition of the entire set of goods---i.e., the goods are…
\textit{Fair division} of resources among competing agents is a fundamental problem in computational social choice and economic game theory. It has been intensively studied on various kinds of items (\textit{divisible} and…
In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment. In GAP, a set of items has to be optimally assigned to a…
We consider the allocation of indivisible objects among agents with different valuations, which can be positive or negative. An egalitarian allocation is an allocation that maximizes the smallest value given to an agent; finding such an…
Many multi-agent coordination problems can be represented as DCOPs. Motivated by task allocation in disaster response, we extend standard DCOP models to consider uncertain task rewards where the outcome of completing a task depends on its…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our emphasis is on the case where the goods are indivisible…
We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other…