Related papers: Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria and their Applicat…

We study the computation of equilibria of anonymous games, via algorithms that may proceed via a sequence of adaptive queries to the game's payoff function, assumed to be unknown initially. The general topic we consider is \emph{query…

Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…

In this paper we propose and analyze a class of $N$-player stochastic games that include finite fuel stochastic games as a special case. We first derive sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the form of a verification…

In this article we evaluate the statistical evidence that a population of students learn about the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the centipede game via repeated play of the game. This is done by formulating a model in which a…

This paper introduces two fundamentally new concepts to game theory: multilateral Nash equilibria and families of games. Starting with non-cooperative games, we show how these notions together seamlessly integrate into and naturally extend…

We consider a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and compact control spaces, which we call stochastic shortest path (SSP) games. They are undiscounted total cost stochastic dynamic games that have a cost-free…

We consider learning approximate Nash equilibria for discrete-time mean-field games with nonlinear stochastic state dynamics subject to both average and discounted costs. To this end, we introduce a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator,…

We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…

This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…

Reinforcement Learning Algorithms (RLA) are useful machine learning tools to understand how decision makers react to signals. It is known that RLA converge towards the pure Nash Equilibria (NE) of finite congestion games and more generally,…

This paper investigates Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems for noncooperative games over multi-players networks with finite bandwidth communication. A distributed quantized algorithm is presented, which consists of local gradient play,…

In this paper, we resolve the computational complexity of a number of outstanding open problems with practical applications. Here is the list of problems we show to be PPAD-complete, along with the domains of practical significance:…

We study the computational complexity of decision problems about Nash equilibria in $m$-player games. Several such problems have recently been shown to be computationally equivalent to the decision problem for the existential theory of the…

We consider a class of N-player stochastic games of multi-dimensional singular control, in which each player faces a minimization problem of monotone-follower type with submodular costs. We call these games "monotone-follower games". In a…

The goal of the paper is to develop the theory of finite state mean field games with major and minor players when the state space of the game is finite. We introduce the finite player games and derive a mean field game formulation in the…

We analyze the sample complexity of learning graphical games from purely behavioral data. We assume that we can only observe the players' joint actions and not their payoffs. We analyze the sufficient and necessary number of samples for the…

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by the nonuniqueness of…

Fictitious play (FP) is one of the most fundamental game-theoretical learning frameworks for computing Nash equilibrium in $n$-player games, which builds the foundation for modern multi-agent learning algorithms. Although FP has provable…