Related papers: On the Complexity of Exchanging
When multiple agents are engaged in a network of conflict, some can advance their competitive positions by forming alliances with each other. However, the costs associated with establishing an alliance may outweigh the potential benefits.…
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather than the search problem of finding the successful manipulative…
Redistricting efforts have gathered contemporary attention in both popular and scholarly debates, particularly in the United States where efforts to redraw congressional districts to favor either of the two major parties in 12 states --…
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \setminus S will do, which in turn depends…
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s).…
This paper studies the complexity of computing a representation of a simple game as the intersection (union) of weighted majority games, as well as, the dimension or the codimension. We also present some examples with linear dimension and…
We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Coalition Logic is an important logic in logical studies of strategic reasoning, whose models are concurrent game models. In this paper, first, we systematically discuss three assumptions of concurrent game models and argue that they are…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
In many settings, there is an organizer who would like to divide a set of agents into $k$ coalitions, and cares about the friendships within each coalition. Specifically, the organizer might want to maximize utilitarian social welfare,…
We study the computational complexity of the popular board game backgammon. We show that deciding whether a player can win from a given board configuration is NP-Hard, PSPACE-Hard, and EXPTIME-Hard under different settings of known and…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
The present study explores a problem that can be resolved by employing the notion of a partially defined cooperative game, yet cannot by using a restricted game. The following situation is considered: First, it is assumed that the worth of…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is…
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems with unit execution times to minimize the sum of completion times. By supposing an initial schedule and associating each job (consisting in a number of…