Related papers: Symmetric majority rules
We study a model of a population making a binary decision based on information spreading within the population, which is fully connected or covering a square grid. We assume that a fraction of the population wants to make the choice of the…
This note characterizes every qualified majority voting rule in environments with just two alternatives through anonymity, responsiveness, and q-neutrality. Crucially, the latter imposes independence of the labels of the alternatives if and…
We study quantum dichotomies and the resource theory of asymmetric distinguishability using a generalization of Strassen's theorem on preordered semirings. We find that an asymptotic variant of relative submajorization, defined on…
May's classical theorem states that in a single-winner choose-one voting system with just two candidates, majority rule is the only social choice function satisfying anonimity, neutrality and positive responsiveness axiom. Anonimity and…
Given only aggregate choice data and limited information about how menus are distributed across the population, we describe what can be inferred robustly about the distribution of preferences (or more general decision rules). We strengthen…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
Algorithmic fairness has grown rapidly as a research area, yet key concepts remain unsettled, especially in criminal justice. We review group, individual, and process fairness and map the conditions under which they conflict. We then…
Patterns on numerical semigroups are multivariate linear polynomials, and they are said to be admissible if there exists a numerical semigroup such that evaluated at any nonincreasing sequence of elements of the semigroup gives integers…
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is…
We introduce and study the property of orthogonal independence, a restricted additivity axiom applying when alternatives are orthogonal. The axiom requires that the preference for one marginal change over another should be maintained after…
We study a two-alternative voting game where voters' preferences depend on an unobservable world state and each voter receives a private signal correlated to the true world state. We consider the collective decision when voters can…
Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a…
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…
We study maximal seating arrangements, either on a line, or in a rectangular auditorium with a fixed number of columns but an arbitrary number of rows, that obey any prescribed set of `social distancing' restrictions. In addition to…
We consider different choice procedures such as scoring rules, rules, using majority relation, value function and tournament matrix, which are used in social and multi-criteria choice problems. We focus on the study of the properties that…
We study the problem of {\em impartial selection}, a topic that lies at the intersection of computational social choice and mechanism design. The goal is to select the most popular individual among a set of community members. The input can…
We explore the role of group symmetries in binary classification tasks, presenting a novel framework that leverages the principles of Neyman-Pearson optimality. Contrary to the common intuition that larger symmetry groups lead to improved…
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given election. Using synthetic elections coming from…
The literature on judgment aggregation is moving from studying impossibility results regarding aggregation rules towards studying specific judgment aggregation rules. Here we give a structured list of most rules that have been proposed and…
We consider the predictive problem of supervised ranking, where the task is to rank sets of candidate items returned in response to queries. Although there exist statistical procedures that come with guarantees of consistency in this…