Related papers: Equilibrium under uncertainty with Sugeno payoff

This paper studies a nonzero-sum Dynkin game in discrete time under non-exponential discounting. For both players, there are two levels of game-theoretic reasoning intertwined. First, each player looks for an intra-personal equilibrium…

We introduce a novel equilibrium concept that incorporates Knightian uncertainty into the cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005). This concept is then applied to a two-player game in which agents can engage in trade or refuse to do so.…

This paper provides a general characterization of subgame perfect equilibria for strategic timing problems, where two firms have the (real) option to make an irreversible investment. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

This paper introduces a framework for finite non-cooperative games where each player faces a globally uncertain parameter with no common prior. Every player chooses both a mixed strategy and projects an emergent subjective prior to the…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

A recently introduced concept of "cooperative equilibrium", based on the assumption that players have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour in social dilemmas. In this paper, we…

Traditional game theory assumes that the players in the game are aware of the rules of the game. However, in practice, often the players are unaware or have only partial knowledge about the game they are playing. They may also have…

We generalize the model of Gallice and Monzon (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their…

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

We add here another layer to the literature on nonatomic anonymous games started with the 1973 paper by Schmeidler. More specifically, we define a new notion of equilibrium which we call $\varepsilon$-estimated equilibrium and prove its…

This paper focuses on finite-player incomplete information games where players may hold mutually inconsistent beliefs without a common prior. We introduce absolute continuity of beliefs, extending the classical notion of absolutely…

This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…

We present a subjective equilibrium notion (called "subjective equilibrium under beliefs of exogenous uncertainty (SEBEU)" for stochastic dynamic games in which each player chooses her decisions under the (incorrect) belief that a…

We study solution concepts for normal-form games. We obtain a characterization of Nash equilibria and logit quantal response equilibria, as well as generalizations capturing non-expected utility. Our axioms reflect that players are…

In this note, we prove the existence of an equilibrium concept, dubbed conditional strategy equilibrium, for non-cooperative games in which a strategy of a player is a function from the other players' actions to her own actions. We study…

The assumptions of necessary rationality and necessary knowledge of strategies, also known as perfect prediction, lead to at most one surviving outcome, immune to the knowledge that the players have of them. Solutions concepts implementing…

The use of game theoretic methods for control in multiagent systems has been an important topic in recent research. Valid utility games in particular have been used to model real-world problems; such games have the convenient property that…