Related papers: Coalition Games on Interaction Graphs: A Horticult…
The arboricity of a graph is the minimum number of forests required to cover all its edges. In this paper, we examine arboricity from a game-theoretic perspective and investigate cost-sharing in the minimum forest cover problem. We…
We study the approximate core for edge cover games, which are cooperative games stemming from edge cover problems. In these games, each player controls a vertex on a network $G = (V, E; w)$, and the cost of a coalition $S\subseteq V$ is…
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a…
Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
Let $G$ be a graph with vertex set $V$ and of order $n = |V|$, and let $\delta(G)$ and $\Delta(G)$ be the minimum and maximum degree of $G$, respectively. Two disjoint sets $V_1, V_2 \subseteq V$ form a coalition in $G$ if none of them is a…
We propose a class of cooperative games, called d Partitioned Compbinatorial Optimization Games (PCOGs). The input of PCOG consists of a set of agents and a combinatorial structure (typically a graph) with a fixed optimization goal on this…
We propose a coalition game model for the problem of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model, the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sum-rate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core…
Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, where agents may fail to participate in the game. In the…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
A graph is subcubic if it is connected and its maximum vertex degree does not exceed 3. Two disjoint vertex subsets of a graph $G$ form a connected coalition in $G$ if neither of them is a connected dominating set but their union is a…
The connected coalition in a graph $G=(V,E)$ consists of two disjoint sets of vertices $V_{1}$ and $V_{2}$, neither of which is a connected dominating set but whose union $V_{1}\cup V_{2}$, is a connected dominating set. A connected…
This paper introduces the Myerson interaction index (MII), an extension of the Shapley interaction index to cooperative games with communication structures restricted by graphs. We establish a formal framework for interaction indices on…
We study hedonic coalition formation games in which cooperation among the players is restricted by a graph structure: a subset of players can form a coalition if and only if they are connected in the given graph. We investigate the…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
Cooperation between nodes sharing a wireless channel is becoming increasingly necessary to achieve performance goals in a wireless network. The problem of determining the feasibility and stability of cooperation between rational nodes in a…