Related papers: Equilibrium in Misspecified Markov Decision Proces…

Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed…

We consider the general problem of determining the steady state of stochastic nonequilibrium systems such as those that have been used to model (among other things) biological transport and traffic flow. We begin with a broad overview of…

Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…

This letter studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in partially observable Markov potential games. Solving this problem is challenging due to partial observability, decentralized information, and the curse of dimensionality. First, to…

We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his actions over time. Misspecified beliefs about time lags…

This paper extends the framework of partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to multi-agent settings by incorporating the notion of agent models into the state space. Agents maintain beliefs over physical states of the…

We consider a multi-agent noncooperative game with agents' objective functions being affected by uncertainty. Following a data driven paradigm, we represent uncertainty by means of scenarios and seek a robust Nash equilibrium solution. We…

This paper considers maximum likelihood (ML) estimation in a large class of models with hidden Markov regimes. We investigate consistency of the ML estimator and local asymptotic normality for the models under general conditions which allow…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

Given two probability measures on sequential data, we investigate the transport problem with time-inconsistent preferences in a discrete-time setting. Motivating examples are nonlinear objectives, state-dependent costs, and regularized…

This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…

We study misspecified Bayesian learning in principal-agent relationships, where an agent is assessed by an evaluator and rewarded by the market. The agent's outcome depends on their innate ability, costly effort -- whose effectiveness is…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

We show that nonequilibrium dynamics can play a constructive role in unsupervised machine learning by inducing the spontaneous emergence of latent-state cycles. We introduce a model in which visible and hidden variables interact through two…

We study a full implementation problem with a state unknown to the designer but known to agents, where agents have uncertain evidence privately drawn from state-dependent distributions. Stochastic evidence enables ``perfect deceptions,''…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

We study sequential decision-making when the agent's internal model class is misspecified. Within the infinite-horizon Berk-Nash framework, stable behavior arises as a fixed point: the agent acts optimally relative to a subjective model,…

We consider a nonzero-sum Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The goal of each player is to maximize his respective discounted payoff function under the condition that some constraints on a…

A mean-field selective optimal control problem of multipopulation dynamics via transient leadership is considered. The agents in the system are described by their spatial position and their probability of belonging to a certain population.…

We investigate the classical active pure exploration problem in Markov Decision Processes, where the agent sequentially selects actions and, from the resulting system trajectory, aims at identifying the best policy as fast as possible. We…