Related papers: Facility location with double-peaked preference
We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure…
We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize…
We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching…
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. There are n agents located on that interval, divided into two types: type 1 agents, who wish for the facility to be…
In this paper, we investigate the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem ($m$-CFLP) on a line. We focus on two frameworks. In the first framework, the number of facilities is arbitrary, all facilities have…
We study facility location problems where agents control multiple locations and when reporting their locations can choose to hide some locations (hiding), report some locations more than once (replication) and lie about their locations…
We study the problem of locating a single obnoxious facility on the normalized line segment $[0,1]$ with strategic agents from a mechanism design perspective. Each agent has a preference for the undesirable location of the facility and…
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…
In this work we consider general facility location and social choice problems, in which sets of agents $\mathcal{A}$ and facilities $\mathcal{F}$ are located in a metric space, and our goal is to assign agents to facilities (as well as…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
We study the problem of design of strategyproof in expectation (SP) mechanisms for facility location on a cycle, with the objective of minimizing the sum of costs of $n$ agents. We show that there exists an SP mechanism that attains an…
In multiagent systems, we often have a set of agents each of which have a preference ordering over a set of items and one would like to know these preference orderings for various tasks, for example, data analysis, preference aggregation,…
We consider the problem of locating a single facility for 2 agents in $L_p$ space ($1<p<\infty$) and give a nearly complete characterization of such deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. We use the distance between an agent and the…
User preference learning is generally a hard problem. Individual preferences are typically unknown even to users themselves, while the space of choices is infinite. Here we study user preference learning from information-theoretic…
We consider $k$-Facility Location games, where $n$ strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to $k\ge 2$ facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize her distance to the nearest facility. We are…
This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…
We study the problem of approximate social welfare maximization (without money) in one-sided matching problems when agents have unrestricted cardinal preferences over a finite set of items. Random priority is a very well-known…
We consider the strategyproof facility location problem on a circle. We focus on the case of 5 agents, and find a tight bound for the PCD strategyproof mechanism, which selects the reported location of an agent in proportion to the length…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
We study resource allocation problems in which a central planner allocates resources among strategic agents with private cost functions in order to minimize a social cost, defined as an aggregate of the agents' costs. This setting poses two…