Related papers: Pareto Efficient Nash Implementation Via Approval …
In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single…
We study the problem of maximizing Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of agents' utilities, in two well-known models. The first model involves one-sided preferences, where a set of indivisible items is allocated among a group…
Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…
We introduce a general representation of large-population games in which each player s influence ON the others IS centralized AND limited, but may otherwise be arbitrary.This representation significantly generalizes the class known AS…
A mechanism is described that addresses the fundamental trade off between media producers who want to increase reach and consumers who provide attention based on the rate of utility received, and where overreach negatively impacts that…
We consider collective decision making when the society consists of groups endowed with voting weights. Each group chooses an internal rule that specifies the allocation of its weight to the alternatives as a function of its members'…
We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…
Participatory budgeting (PB) has been widely adopted and has attracted significant research efforts; however, there is a lack of mechanisms for PB which elicit project interactions, such as substitution and complementarity, from voters.…
We investigate a portfolio selection problem involving multi competitive agents, each exhibiting mean-variance preferences. Unlike classical models, each agent's utility is determined by their relative wealth compared to the average wealth…
We study incentive-compatible mechanisms that maximize the Nash Social Welfare. Since traditional incentive-compatible mechanisms cannot maximize the Nash Social Welfare even approximately, we propose changing the traditional model.…
Studies of voluntary vaccination decisions by rational individuals predict that the population will reach a Nash equilibrium with vaccination coverage below the societal optimum. Human decision-making involves mechanisms in addition to…
Referring to a standard context of voting theory, and to the classic notion of voting situation, here we show that it is possible to observe any arbitrary set of elections' outcomes, no matter how paradoxical it may appear. On this purpose…
Multiplicative Kantian equilibrium explains cooperative behavior in social dilemmas without abandoning methodological individualism. However, its outcomes depend critically on the parametrization of the strategy space - the property of…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
It is known that the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality. Our aim in this work is to introduce a variational approach to study the existence of solutions for generalized ordinal Nash…
We formulate two-party policy competition as a two-player non-cooperative game, generalizing Lin et al.'s work (2021). Each party selects a real-valued policy vector as its strategy from a compact subset of Euclidean space, and a voter's…
Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with…