Related papers: Coordination Games on Graphs
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Within the context of games on networks S. Goyal (Goya (2007), pg. 39) posed the following problem. Under any arbitrary but fixed topology, does there exist at least one pure Nash equilibrium that exhibits a positive relation between the…
In this paper we study the problem of exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set of a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions of the players alone. We consider sparse linear influence games --- a…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be…
In a graphical game agents play with their neighbors on a graph to achieve an appropriate state of equilibrium. Here relevant problems are characterizing the equilibrium set and discovering efficient algorithms to find such an equilibrium…
We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and…
Various social contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection can be depicted as games of strategic interactions, where a player's well-being depends on her own action as well as on the actions taken by her…
We show that in any $n$-player $m$-action normal-form game, we can obtain an approximate equilibrium by sampling any mixed-action equilibrium a small number of times. We study three types of equilibria: Nash, correlated and coarse…
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum…
A common assumption in the existing network coding literature is that the users are cooperative and non-selfish. However, this assumption can be violated in practice. In this paper, we analyze inter-session network coding in a wired network…
We consider the effects of altruistic behavior on random medium access control (slotted ALOHA) for local area communication networks. For an idealized, synchronously iterative, two-player game with asymmetric player demands, we find a…
In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…
The price of anarchy (PoA) is a popular metric for analyzing the inefficiency of self-interested decision making. Although its study is widespread, characterizing the PoA can be challenging. A commonly employed approach is based on the…
We analyze a game-theoretic abstraction of epidemic containment played on an undirected graph $G$: each player is associated with a node in $G$ and can either acquire protection from a contagious process or risk infection. After decisions…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
This paper is a significant step forward in understanding dependency equilibria within the framework of real algebraic geometry encompassing both pure and mixed equilibria. In alignment with Spohn's original definition of dependency…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…