Related papers: Imitation Dynamics with Payoff Shocks
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…
Animal behavior and evolution can often be described by game-theoretic models. Although in many situations, the number of players is very large, their strategic interactions are usually decomposed into a sum of two-player games. Only…
We study equilibrium selection for invariant measures of stochastic dynamical systems with constant step size, under persistent noise and minimal moment assumptions, in a general quasi-Feller framework. Such dynamics arise in…
We consider a novel model of stochastic replicator dynamics for potential games that converts to a Langevin equation on a sphere after a change of variables. This is distinct from the models studied earlier. In particular, it is ill-posed…
Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability…
We study an excitable active rotator with slowly adapting nonlinear feedback and noise. Depending on the adaptation and the noise level, this system may display noise-induced spiking, noise-perturbed oscillations, or stochastic busting. We…
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the…
We propose a model for the dynamics of a social system, which includes diffusive effects and a biased rule for spin-flips, reproducing the effect of strategic choices. This model is able to mimic some phenomena taking place during marketing…
We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p…
We investigate the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two person differential games. The main result of the paper is the characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in the terms of nonsmooth analysis. Also we obtain the…
A stochastic model for behavioral changes by imitative pair interactions of individuals is developed. `Microscopic' assumptions on the specific form of the imitative processes lead to a stochastic version of the game dynamical equations.…
A replicator equation with mutation processes is numerically studied. Without any mutations, two characteristics of the replicator dynamics are known: an exponential divergence of the dominance period, and hierarchical orderings of the…
We consider the rates of noise-induced switching between the stable states of dissipative dynamical systems with delay and also the rates of noise-induced extinction, where such systems model population dynamics. We study a class of systems…
We consider a model of learning and evolution in games whose action sets are endowed with a partition-based similarity structure intended to capture exogenous similarities between strategies. In this model, revising agents have a higher…
In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \emph{Hannan consistency}, or \emph{no-regret}. However, the…
In this paper we investigate a stochastic model for an economic game. To describe this model we have used a Wiener process, as the noise has a stabilization effect. The dynamics are studied in terms of stochastic stability in the stationary…
We study a generic family of two-player continuous-time nonzero-sum stopping games modeling a war of attrition with symmetric information and stochastic payoffs that depend on an homogeneous linear diffusion. We first show that any…
Extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game. But if players are able to adopt the strategies performing better, extortion becomes widespread and evolutionary unstable. It may sometimes act as a…
In evolutionary game dynamics, reproductive success increases with the performance in an evolutionary game. If strategy $A$ performs better than strategy $B$, strategy $A$ will spread in the population. Under stochastic dynamics, a single…
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…