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We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
Projection games constitute an important class of nonlocal games where, for any answer from the first player, there is a unique correct answer for the second player. This class of games captures nonlocal games arising from constraint…
Subtraction games have a rich literature as normal-play combinatorial games (e.g., Berlekamp, Conway, and Guy, 1982). Recently, the theory has been extended to zero-sum scoring play (Cohensius et al. 2019). Here, we take the approach of…
In the 60's Shapley provided an example of a two player fictitious game with periodic behaviour. In this game, player $A$ aims to copy $B$'s behaviour and player $B$ aims to play one ahead of player $A$. In this paper we generalize…
In this paper, we provide exponential rates of convergence to the interior Nash equilibrium for continuous-time dual-space game dynamics such as mirror descent (MD) and actor-critic (AC). We perform our analysis in $N$-player continuous…
We derive formulas for the performance of capital assets in continuous time from an efficient market hypothesis, with no stochastic assumptions and no assumptions about the beliefs or preferences of investors. Our efficient market…
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…
Based on Brownian ratchets, a counter-intuitive phenomenon has recently emerged -- namely, that two losing games can yield, when combined, a paradoxical tendency to win. A restriction of this phenomenon is that the rules depend on the…
We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…
We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n+1 players zero-sum game. We suppose the existence of the n+1-th player in addition to n players in the main game, and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by…
We conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discrete-time exponential-weights dynamic with a constant step size on all general-sum and symmetric $2 \times 2$ normal-form games, i.e. games with $2$ pure strategies per player, and where the…
The famous theorem of R.Aumann and M.Maschler states that the sequence of values of an N-stage zero-sum game G_N with incomplete information on one side converges as N tends to infinity, and the error term is bounded by a constant divided…
Offline Reinforcement Learning (RL) enables policy improvement from fixed datasets without online interactions, making it highly suitable for real-world applications lacking efficient simulators. Despite its success in the single-agent…
Potential games and decentralised partially observable MDPs (Dec-POMDPs) are two commonly used models of multi-agent interaction, for static optimisation and sequential decisionmaking settings, respectively. In this paper we introduce…
In a satisficing equilibrium each agent $i$ plays one of her top $k_i$ actions in response to the actions of the other agents. Our concept unifies models of bounded rationality and yields predictions that differ from canonical solution…
We study zero-sum games, a variant of the classical combinatorial Subtraction games (studied for example in the monumental work "Winning Ways", by Berlekamp, Conway and Guy), called Cumulative Subtraction (CS). Two players alternate in…
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another---if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an…
A new class of multi-player competitive stochastic games in discrete-time with an affine specification of the redistribution of payoffs at exercise is proposed and examined. Our games cover as a very special case the classic two-person…
The paper is concerned with distributed learning in large-scale games. The well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm is addressed, which, despite theoretical convergence results, might be impractical to implement in large-scale settings due…
Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a…