Related papers: Sharing Non-Anonymous Costs of Multiple Resources …

We consider a weighted Shapley network design game, where selfish players choose paths in a network to minimize their cost. The cost function of each edge in the network is affine linear with respect to the sum of weights of the players who…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price \alpha > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game,…

We consider normal-form games with $n$ players and two strategies for each player, where the payoffs are i.i.d. random variables with some distribution $F$ and we consider issues related to the pure equilibria in the game as the number of…

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…

In the traditional game-theoretic set up, where agents select actions and experience corresponding utilities, an equilibrium is a configuration where no agent can improve their utility by unilaterally switching to a different action. In…

In a decentralized system with $m$ machines, we study the selfish scheduling problem where each user strategically chooses which machine to use. Each machine incurs a cost, which is a function of the total load assigned to it, and some…

We generalize the notions of user equilibrium and system optimum to non-atomic congestion games with stochastic demands. We establish upper bounds on the price of anarchy for three different settings of link cost functions and demand…

In this paper we study a game where every player is to choose a vertex (facility) in a given undirected graph. All vertices (customers) are then assigned to closest facilities and a player's payoff is the number of customers assigned to it.…

In load balancing problems there is a set of clients, each wishing to select a resource from a set of permissible ones, in order to execute a certain task. Each resource has a latency function, which depends on its workload, and a client's…

Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each…

We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model…

We introduce a game-theoretic framework to ex- plore revenue sharing in an Edge-Cloud computing system, in which computing service providers at the edge of the Internet (edge providers) and computing service providers at the cloud (cloud…

We broaden the basis of non-cooperative game theory by considering miscoordination on a solution concept. For any solution concept, we extend the solution set of a strategic-form game to a transition set. This set contains profiles where…

In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two…

We initiate the study of congestion games with variable demands where the (variable) demand has to be assigned to exactly one subset of resources. The players' incentives to use higher demands are stimulated by non-decreasing and concave…

Congestion games constitute an important class of games to model resource allocation by different users. As computing an exact or even an approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS-complete, Caragiannis et al. (2011) present a…

A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…