Related papers: Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms
This paper introduces a framework for Planning while Learning where an agent is given a goal to achieve in an environment whose behavior is only partially known to the agent. We discuss the tractability of various plan-design processes. We…
We propose here to look at how abstract a model of a usable system can be, but still say something useful and interesting, so this paper is an exercise in abstraction and formalisation, with usability-of-design as an example target use. We…
We study minimal single-task peer prediction mechanisms that have limited knowledge about agents' beliefs. Without knowing what agents' beliefs are or eliciting additional information, it is not possible to design a truthful mechanism in a…
Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The…
In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (possibly unsophisticated) bidders from the need to engage in…
We study the budget aggregation problem in which a set of strategic voters must split a finite divisible resource (such as money or time) among a set of competing projects. Our goal is twofold: We seek truthful mechanisms that provide…
Verification is the process of checking whether a product has been implemented according to its prescribed specifications. We study the case of a designer (the developer) that needs to verify its design by a third party (the verifier), by…
Estimating the fidelity with a target state is important in quantum information tasks. Many fidelity estimation techniques present a suitable measurement scheme to perform the estimation. In contrast, we present techniques that allow the…
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
We study the design of truthful mechanisms for set systems, i.e., scenarios where a customer needs to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task. In this setting, frugality [Archer&Tardos'02] provides a measure to evaluate the "cost of…
Fairness in machine learning is more important than ever as ethical concerns continue to grow. Individual fairness demands that individuals differing only in sensitive attributes receive the same outcomes. However, commonly used machine…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
We present a verification methodology for analysing the decision-making component in agent-based hybrid systems. Traditionally hybrid automata have been used to both implement and verify such systems, but hybrid automata based modelling,…
Recently, requirements for the explainability of software systems have gained prominence. One of the primary motivators for such requirements is that explainability is expected to facilitate stakeholders' trust in a system. Although this…
The current verification flow of complex systems uses different engines synergistically: virtual prototyping, formal verification, simulation, emulation and FPGA prototyping. However, none is able to verify a complete architecture.…
Formal verification of complex algorithms is challenging. Verifying their implementations goes beyond the state of the art of current automatic verification tools and usually involves intricate mathematical theorems. Certifying algorithms…
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
A reliable method for characterizing quantum operations that is suitable for improving and validating their accuracies is indispensable for realizing a practical quantum computer. Known methods are still not sufficient because they lack…
This paper is a survey of recent work at the intersection of mechanism design and privacy. The connection is a natural one, but its study has been jump-started in recent years by the advent of differential privacy, which provides a…