Related papers: Verifiably Truthful Mechanisms
Classic evaluation methods of believable agents are time-consuming because they involve many human to judge agents. They are well suited to validate work on new believable behaviours models. However, during the implementation, numerous…
Designing and implementing explainable systems is seen as the next step towards increasing user trust in, acceptance of and reliance on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. While explaining choices made by black-box algorithms such as…
Mandating public availability of computer code underlying computational simulation modeling research ends up doing a disservice to the cause of model verification when inconsistencies between the specifications in the publication text and…
Formal software verification uses mathematical techniques to establish that software has certain properties. For example, that the behaviour of a software system satisfies certain logically-specified properties. Formal methods have a long…
The design of genetic networks with specific functions is one of the major goals of synthetic biology. However, constructing biological devices that work "as required" remains challenging, while the cost of uncovering flawed designs…
Federated knowledge discovery and data mining are challenged to assess the trustworthiness of data originating from autonomous sources while protecting confidentiality and privacy. Truth-finding algorithms help corroborate data from…
We study a truthful two-facility location problem in which a set of agents have private positions on the line of real numbers and known approval preferences over two different facilities. Given the locations of the two facilities, the cost…
Explainable machine learning and artificial intelligence models have been used to justify a model's decision-making process. This added transparency aims to help improve user performance and understanding of the underlying model. However,…
We study the problem of fairly and truthfully allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive preferences. Specifically, we consider truthful mechanisms outputting allocations that satisfy EF$^{+u}_{-v}$, where, in an…
We consider a problem where agents have private positions on a line, and public approval preferences over two facilities, and their cost is the maximum distance from their approved facilities. The goal is to decide the facility locations to…
Automated decision systems are increasingly used for consequential decision making -- for a variety of reasons. These systems often rely on sophisticated yet opaque models, which do not (or hardly) allow for understanding how or why a given…
The trustworthiness of modern networked services is too important to leave to chance. We need to design these services with specific properties in mind, and verify that the properties hold. In this paper, we argue that a compositional…
For product rating environments, similar to that of Amazon Reviews, it has been shown that the truthful elicitation of feedback is possible through mechanisms which pay buyer reports contingent on the reports of other buyers. We study…
We study the facility location games with candidate locations from a mechanism design perspective. Suppose there are n agents located in a metric space whose locations are their private information, and a group of candidate locations for…
Fairness is well studied in the context of resource allocation. Researchers have proposed various fairness notions like envy-freeness (EF), and its relaxations, proportionality and max-min share (MMS). There is vast literature on the…
The problem of peer prediction is to elicit information from agents in settings without any objective ground truth against which to score reports. Peer prediction mechanisms seek to exploit correlations between signals to align incentives…
Modern data marketplaces and data sharing consortia increasingly rely on incentive mechanisms to encourage agents to contribute data. However, schemes that reward agents based on the quantity of submitted data are vulnerable to…
A recent line of work in mechanism design has focused on guaranteeing incentive compatibility for agents without contingent reasoning skills: obviously strategyproof mechanisms guarantee that it is "obvious" for these imperfectly rational…
Technological advancement allows information to be shared in just a single click, which has enabled the rapid spread of false information. This makes automated fact-checking system necessary to ensure the safety and integrity of our online…
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…