Related papers: Computational issues in time-inconsistent planning

The inefficiency of selfish routing in congested networks is a classical problem in algorithmic game theory, often captured by the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio between the social cost of decentralized decisions and that of a centrally…

Bounded agents are limited by intrinsic constraints on their ability to process information that is available in their sensors and memory and choose actions and memory updates. In this dissertation, we model these constraints as…

This paper bridges some of the gap between optimal planning and reinforcement learning (RL), both of which share roots in dynamic programming applied to sequential decision making or optimal control. Whereas planning typically favors…

Considering congestion games with uncertain delays, we compute the inefficiency introduced in network routing by risk-averse agents. At equilibrium, agents may select paths that do not minimize the expected latency so as to obtain lower…

The threat of algorithmic collusion, and whether it merits regulatory intervention, remains debated, as existing evaluations of its emergence often rely on long learning horizons, assumptions about counterparty rationality in adopting…

In this paper we consider the problem of scheduling on parallel machines with a presence of incompatibilities between jobs. The incompatibility relation can be modeled as a complete multipartite graph in which each edge denotes a pair of…

We study bicriteria versions of Makespan Minimization on Unrelated Machines and Santa Claus by allowing a constrained number of rejections. Given an instance of Makespan Minimization on Unrelated Machines where the optimal makespan for…

Stochastic matching is the stochastic version of the well-known matching problem, which consists in maximizing the rewards of a matching under a set of probability distributions associated with the nodes and edges. In most stochastic…

Graph planning gives rise to fundamental algorithmic questions such as shortest path, traveling salesman problem, etc. A classical problem in discrete planning is to consider a weighted graph and construct a path that maximizes the sum of…

We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…

In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average…

Dybvig (1988a,b) solves in a complete market setting the problem of finding a payoff that is cheapest possible in reaching a given target distribution ("cost-efficient payoff"). In the presence of ambiguity, the distribution of a payoff is,…

The interval scheduling problem is one variant of the scheduling problem. In this paper, we propose a novel variant of the interval scheduling problem, whose definition is as follows: given jobs are specified by their {\em release times},…

Traffic congestion has become an inevitable challenge in large cities due to population increases and expansion of urban areas. Various approaches are introduced to mitigate traffic issues, encompassing from expanding the road…

We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…

We study how to allocate inference-time compute for competitive programming under fixed budgets. Evaluating 216 Codeforces problems across Divisions 1-3, we compare agent-based reasoning with repeated independent sampling (k-shot) as a…

Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…

Modeling the purposeful behavior of imperfect agents from a small number of observations is a challenging task. When restricted to the single-agent decision-theoretic setting, inverse optimal control techniques assume that observed behavior…

Incentives are more likely to elicit desired outcomes when they are designed based on accurate models of agents' strategic behavior. A growing literature, however, suggests that people do not quite behave like standard economic agents in a…

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…