Related papers: Competitive analysis via benchmark decomposition
We consider the design of computationally efficient online learning algorithms in an adversarial setting in which the learner has access to an offline optimization oracle. We present an algorithm called Generalized…
Differentiable economics -- the use of deep learning for auction design -- has driven progress in the automated design of multi-item auctions with additive or unit-demand valuations. However, little progress has been made for optimal…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
Repeated multi-unit auctions, where a seller allocates multiple identical items over many rounds, are common mechanisms in electricity markets and treasury auctions. We compare the two predominant formats: uniform-price and discriminatory…
We study a sequential price competition among $N$ sellers, each influenced by the pricing decisions of their rivals. Specifically, the demand function for each seller $i$ follows the single index model $\lambda_i(\mathbf p) = \mu_i(\langle…
In many applications, ads are displayed together with the prices, so as to provide a direct comparison among similar products or services. The price-displaying feature not only influences the consumers' decisions, but also affects the…
Most of the work in the auction design literature assumes that bidders behave rationally based on the information available for every individual auction, and the revelation principle enables designers to restrict their efforts to incentive…
The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an…
Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial…
We apply competitive analysis onto the problem of minimizing the number of queries to an oracle to completely reconstruct a given monotone Boolean function. Besides lower and upper bounds on the competitivity we determine optimal…
Iterative combinatorial auctions (CAs) are often used in multi-billion dollar domains like spectrum auctions, and speed of convergence is one of the crucial factors behind the choice of a specific design for practical applications. To…
We study the problem of auction design for advertising platforms that face strategic advertisers who are bidding across platforms. Each advertiser's goal is to maximize their total value or conversions while satisfying some constraint(s)…
We consider a generalization of the $k$-flow set system auction where the set to be procured by a customer corresponds to a feasible solution to a linear programming problem where the coefficient matrix and right-hand-side together…
In this work we are concerned with the design of efficient mechanisms while eliciting limited information from the agents. First, we study the performance of sampling approximations in facility location games. Our key result is to show that…
Online resource allocation problems are central challenges in economics and computer science, modeling situations in which $n$ items arriving one at a time must each be immediately allocated among $m$ agents. In such problems, our objective…
This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent…
We consider online procurement auctions, where the agents arrive sequentially, in random order, and have private costs for their services. The buyer aims to maximize a monotone submodular value function for the subset of agents whose…
Algorithms based on combinatorial auctions show significant potential regarding their application for channel assignment problems in multi-connectivity ultra-reliable wireless networks. However the computational effort required by such…
Given a sample of bids from independent auctions, this paper examines the question of inference on auction fundamentals (e.g. valuation distributions, welfare measures) under weak assumptions on information structure. The question is…
We initiate the study of markets for private data, though the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a theory of privacy as a commodity is missing. In this paper, we…