Related papers: On the three-person game baccara banque
We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…
In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
This paper introduces a unified framework called cooperative extensive form games, which (i) generalizes standard non-cooperative games, and (ii) allows for more complex coalition formation dynamics than previous concepts like…
The notion of fault tolerant Nash equilibria has been introduced as a way of studying the robustness of Nash equilibria. Under this notion, a fixed number of players are allowed to exhibit faulty behavior in which they may deviate…
In this paper, we introduce a family of games called concave pro-rata games. In such a game, players place their assets into a pool, and the pool pays out some concave function of all assets placed into it. Each player then receives a…
In nature and society problems arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile, which are modeled in game theory. While most applications assume uncorrelated games, a more detailed modeling is necessary to consider the…
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not…
We consider a symmetric multi-players zero-sum game with two strategic variables. There are $n$ players, $n\geq 3$. Each player is denoted by $i$. Two strategic variables are $t_i$ and $s_i$, $i\in \{1, \dots, n\}$. They are related by…
In this paper, we delve into the problem of using monetary incentives to encourage players to shift from an initial Nash equilibrium to a more favorable one within a game. Our main focus revolves around computing the minimum reward required…
We consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria in potential games where each player's strategy set is subject to private uncoupled constraints. This scenario is frequently encountered in real-world applications like road network…
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
Zero-sum stochastic games have found important applications in a variety of fields, from machine learning to economics. Work on this model has primarily focused on the computation of Nash equilibrium due to its effectiveness in solving…
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions…
We formulate a conjecture from graph theory that is equivalent to Nash-solvability of the finite two-person shortest path games with positive local costs. For the three-person games such conjecture fails.
This paper deals with N-person nonzero-sum discrete-time Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the transition probabilities and reward functions are allowed to vary with time. Differing from the existing works on the expected…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
Coordination games have been of interest to game theorists, economists, and ecologists for many years to study such problems as the emergence of local conventions and the evolution of cooperative behavior. Approaches for understanding the…