Related papers: The Principal-Agent Problem; A Stochastic Maximum …

What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…

We prove a stochastic maximum principle for a control problem where the state equation is delayed both in the state and in the control, and also the final cost functional may depend on the past trajectories. The adjoint equations turn out…

We study a Bayesian persuasion problem with externalities. In this model, a principal sends signals to inform multiple agents about the state of the world. Simultaneously, due to the existence of externalities in the agents' utilities, the…

This article studies the problem of evaluating the information that a Principal lacks when establishing an incentive contract with an Agent whose effort is not observable. The Principal ("she") pays a continuous rent to the Agent ("he"),…

The principle of optimality is a fundamental aspect of dynamic programming, which states that the optimal solution to a dynamic optimization problem can be found by combining the optimal solutions to its sub-problems. While this principle…

We study a continuous time contracting model in which a principal hires a risk averse agent to manage a project over a finite horizon and provides sequential payments whose timing is endogenously determined. The resulting nonzero-sum…

We propose an actor-critic framework to solve the time-continuous stochastic optimal control problem. A least square temporal difference method is applied to compute the value function for the critic. The policy gradient method is…

This work studies the online contract design problem. The principal's goal is to learn the optimal contract that maximizes her utility through repeated interactions, without prior knowledge of the agent's type (i.e., the agent's cost and…

We consider numerical resolution of principal-agent (PA) problems in continuous time. We formulate a generic PA model with continuous and lump payments and a multi-dimensional strategy of the agent. To tackle the resulting…

We use the recently developed probabilistic analysis of mean field games with finitely many states in the weak formulation, to set-up a principal / agent contract theory model where the principal faces a large population of agents…

This study addresses primal-dual dynamics for a stochastic programming problem for capacity network design. It is proven that consensus can be achieved on the \textit{here and now} variables which represent the capacity of the network. The…

We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…

We derive a first order optimality condition for a class of agent-based systems, as well as for their mean-field counterpart. A relevant difficulty of our analysis is that the state equation is formulated on possibly infinite-dimensional…

In this paper we formulate and solve an optimal problem for Stochastic process with a regime absorbing state. The solution for this problem is obtained through a system of partial differential equations. The method is applied to obtain an…

Distributed optimization problems have received much attention due to their privacy preservation, parallel computation, less communication, and strong robustness. This paper presents and studies the time-varying distributed optimization…

The main contributions of this paper are three fold. First, our primary concern is to investigate a class of stochastic recursive delayed control problems which arise naturally with sound backgrounds but have not been well-studied yet. For…

In the classical principal-agent hidden-action contract model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. In order to complete the task, the agent chooses an action from a set of actions, where each potential action…

We consider a principal agent project selection problem with asymmetric information. There are $N$ projects and the principal must select exactly one of them. Each project provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent…

In this paper we consider a principal agent problem where the agent is allowed to quit, by incurring a cost. When the current agent quits the job, the principal will hire a new one, possibly with a different type. We characterize the…

The increasing deployment of AI is shaping the future landscape of the internet, which is set to become an integrated ecosystem of AI agents. Orchestrating the interaction among AI agents necessitates decentralized, self-sustaining…