Related papers: Selection-based Approach to Cooperative Interval G…
In many multi-agent settings, participants can form teams to achieve collective outcomes that may far surpass their individual capabilities. Measuring the relative contributions of agents and allocating them shares of the reward that…
How cooperation emerges in human societies is still a puzzle. Evolutionary game theory has been the standard framework to address this issue. In most models, every individual plays with all others, and then reproduce and die according to…
Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…
The evolution of information and communication technologies has yielded the means of sharing measurements and other information in an efficient and flexible way, which has enabled the size and complexity of control applications to increase.…
This paper coins the notion of Joker games, a variant of concurrent games where the players are not strictly adversarial. Instead, Player 1 can get help from Player 2 by playing a Joker move. We formalize these games as cost games and…
Cooperative game theory has become a cornerstone of post-hoc interpretability in machine learning, largely through the use of Shapley values. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, Shapley-based methods often rest on axiomatic…
Cooperation in large groups and one-shot interactions is often hindered by freeloading. Punishment can enforce cooperation, but it is usually regarded as wasteful because the costs of punishing offset its benefits. Here, we analyze an…
Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced in arXiv:1307.2145, arXiv:1403.4958. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given…
We introduce the concept of a multi-principal assistance game (MPAG), and circumvent an obstacle in social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem, by using a sufficiently collegial preference inference mechanism. In an MPAG, a single agent…
A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is involved in different games simultaneously. Interestingly,…
Concurrent game frames are a standard semantic framework for logics of strategic reasoning. Two notions of coalition power can be derived from such frames: alpha powers and actual powers. An alpha power of a coalition is a set of possible…
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection timescale is slower…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…
This article uses data from two experimental studies of two-person Prisoner's Dilemma games [1, 2] and compares the data with the theoretic predictions calculated with the use of a quantum game theoretical method. The experimental findings…
In this paper we consider multi-agent coalitional games with uncertain value functions for which we establish distribution-free guarantees on the probability of allocation stability, i.e., agents do not have incentives to defect from the…
Many settings of interest involving humans and machines -- from virtual personal assistants to autonomous vehicles -- can naturally be modelled as principals (humans) delegating to agents (machines), which then interact with each other on…
We propose a coalition game model for the problem of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model, the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sum-rate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core…
We introduce Value Coalition Logic, a typed assignment-based reconstruction of classical coalition logic. The strategic semantics is unchanged: coalitional ability is still interpreted by the standard one-step game-form clause. The change…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…