Related papers: A Truthful Mechanism for the Generalized Assignmen…
In the strategic facility location problem, a set of agents report their locations in a metric space and the goal is to use these reports to open a new facility, minimizing an aggregate distance measure from the agents to the facility.…
This paper considers prior-independent mechanism design, in which a single mechanism is designed to achieve approximately optimal performance on every prior distribution from a given class. Most results in this literature focus on…
Packing problems are an important class of optimization problems. The probably most well-known problem if this type is knapsack and many generalizations of it have been studied in the literature like Two-dimensional Geometric Knapsack…
The article proposes a heuristic approximation approach to the bin packing problem under multiple objectives. In addition to the traditional objective of minimizing the number of bins, the heterogeneousness of the elements in each bin is…
Reasoning about uncertainty is vital in many real-life autonomous systems. However, current state-of-the-art planning algorithms cannot either reason about uncertainty explicitly, or do so with a high computational burden. Here, we focus on…
We study truthful mechanisms for approximating the Maximin-Share (MMS) allocation of agents with additive valuations for indivisible goods. Algorithmically, constant factor approximations exist for the problem for any number of agents. When…
We study the Min-Weighted Sum Bin Packing problem, a variant of the classical Bin Packing problem in which items have a weight, and each item induces a cost equal to its weight multiplied by the index of the bin in which it is packed. This…
This paper considers stochastic optimization problems with weakly convex objective and constraint functions. We propose Prox-PEP, a proximal method equipped with quadratic subproblems. To handle nonlinear equality constraints, we employ an…
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. The first such mechanism was…
In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the…
In this paper we propose an improved approximation scheme for the Vector Bin Packing problem (VBP), based on the combination of (near-)optimal solution of the Linear Programming (LP) relaxation and a greedy (modified first-fit) heuristic.…
In this paper, we study the problem of \textit{constrained} and \textit{stochastic} continuous submodular maximization. Even though the objective function is not concave (nor convex) and is defined in terms of an expectation, we develop a…
We consider the problem of locating a facility on a network, represented by a graph. A set of strategic agents have different ideal locations for the facility; the cost of an agent is the distance between its ideal location and the…
This paper considers the problem of minimizing a convex expectation function over a closed convex set, coupled with a set of inequality convex expectation constraints. We present a new stochastic approximation type algorithm, namely the…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
We study the truthful facility assignment problem, where a set of agents with private most-preferred points on a metric space are assigned to facilities that lie on the metric space, under capacity constraints on the facilities. The goal is…
The subspace approximation problem Subspace($k$,$p$) asks for a $k$-dimensional linear subspace that fits a given set of points optimally, where the error for fitting is a generalization of the least squares fit and uses the $\ell_{p}$ norm…
This paper considers the design of non-truthful mechanisms from samples. We identify a parameterized family of mechanisms with strategically simple winner-pays-bid, all-pay, and truthful payment formats. In general (not necessarily…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…