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Graph games provide the foundation for modeling and synthesis of reactive processes. Such games are played over graphs where the vertices are controlled by two adversarial players. We consider graph games where the objective of the first…
Decoding strategies play a pivotal role in text generation for modern language models, yet a puzzling gap divides theory and practice. Surprisingly, strategies that should intuitively be optimal, such as Maximum a Posteriori (MAP), often…
Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of maximum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient…
A bipartite graph $G(U,V;E)$ that admits a perfect matching is given. One player imposes a permutation $\pi$ over $V$, the other player imposes a permutation $\sigma$ over $U$. In the greedy matching algorithm, vertices of $U$ arrive in…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
The Minority Game (MG), the Majority Game (MAJG) and the Dollar Game ($G) are important and closely-related versions of market-entry games designed to model different features of real-world financial markets. In a variant of these games,…
The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…
Traditional coding theory guarantees valid decoding only if a minority of symbols are adversarially manipulated. In contrast, the game of coding framework ensures reliable decoding, even in the presence of an adversarial majority. This…
In many situations when people are assigned to coalitions, the utility of each person depends on the friends in her coalition. Additionally, in many situations, the size of each coalition should be bounded. This paper studies such coalition…
In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires…
We study a multi-player one-round game termed Stackelberg Network Pricing Game, in which a leader can set prices for a subset of $m$ priceable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost. Based on the leader's decision one or more…
Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) have been adopted widely for modeling adversarial interactions. With increasing size of the applications of SSGs, scalability of equilibrium computation is an important research problem. While prior…
In this dissertation, we analyze the computational properties of game-theoretic centrality measures. The key idea behind game-theoretic approach to network analysis is to treat nodes as players in a cooperative game, where the value of each…
Consider a situation with $n$ agents or players where some of the players form a coalition with a certain collective objective. Simple games are used to model systems that can decide whether coalitions are successful (winning) or not…
This paper concerns the analysis of the Shapley value in matching games. Matching games constitute a fundamental class of cooperative games which help understand and model auctions and assignments. In a matching game, the value of a…
Nucleus decompositions have been shown to be a useful tool for finding dense subgraphs. The coreness value of a clique represents its density based on the number of other cliques it is adjacent to. One useful output of nucleus decomposition…
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…